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Southeast Asia Report



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27 June 1984

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BRIEFS

FORMER OPPOSITION LEADER RE-ELECTED--NZPA Suva--Fiji's former Opposition leader, Mr Siddiq Koya, has been re-elected National Federation Party leader in Suva. The deputy leader is Mrs Irene Jai Narayan. Mr Koya refused to comment on the Opposition's boycott of Parliament on December 15 last year over a vote of no confidence in the Speaker. The boycott led to the resignation of Mr Jai Ram Reddy as party leader. Mr Koya said the 22 N.F.P. members of Parliament would now return to the House. [Text] [Christchurch THE PRESS in English 22 May 84 p 5]

CSO: 4200/836

JAKARTA PAPER HAILS BAN ON AUSTRALIAN REPORTERS

BK111418 Jakarta THE JAKARTA POST in English 4 Jun 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Ban on ABC Reporters"]

[Text] The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), better known to the outside world as Radio Australia, has taken Papua New Guinea (PNG) for granted. It has had its representatives in PNG, formerly an Australian colony, for many years.

Despite strong objections from the PNG Government, the ABC telecasted a Four Corners program containing an interview with James Nyaro, a gang leader of OPM (Free Papua Organisation) which is opposing Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya. The TV program was apparently embarrassing to Port Moresby. Subsequently, the PNG Government has banned ABC from operating in the country. This means that ABC correspondents, whose visas are due to expire in September, will have to leave PNG.

PNG's objection to the TV interview was that the ABC correspondent, Sean Dorney, had enticed the rebel leader to cross the PNG border illegally, thereby breaking the code of ethics. Besides, Port Moresby did not wish to see its territory being used for such a controversial interview which might hurt the feelings of its neighbor, Indonesia; especially when the two countries are still shadowed by the trauma of recent border tension.

But ABC, under the pretext of the free press principle, neglected the warning and request of the PNG Government. One could certainly understand when Port Moresby was furious with ABC's undertaking as was reflected in the PNG foreign minister's words: "For too long, some sections of the Australian media have viewed this country as still a colony of Australia where they can indulge their egos at the expense of our people."

That an official request from an independent sovereign country was given a deaf ear by the Australian media was obviously too much to be tolerated. Therefore, the banning of ABC by the PNG Government could be easily understood.

By doing so, Port Moresby officials have also showed to the world that their country and people, despite considerable aid from Australia, are truly

independent and that the country's sovereignty cannot be trampled on by whomsoever and at whatever cost. At the same time, that decision also reflected PNG's goodwill and committed attitude to improve its relations with Indonesia.

As a matter of fact, the time has come for ABC to realize that the principle of free flow of information is not always applicable in a certain situation, especially when the information given can impair relations between neighboring countries like Indonesia and PNG.

CSO: 4200/832

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

REACTION TO ACADEMIC'S DEATH--Indonesia has blamed what it calls outrageous and irresponsible reactions from Australia for its silence on the killing of an academic in the province of Irian Jaya, Mr Arnold Ap, in April. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr Mokhtar, said in Jakarta that his government had remained silent because it was apparently a kind of sport, especially in Australia, to accuse Indonesia of all kinds of things. He said Indonesia was sick of being on the defensive and having to explain every move it made. Mr Ap was arrested in November last year for allegedly sympathizing with guerrillas seeking independence from Indonesia for the eastern province. Dr Mokhtar said two armed prison guards helped Mr Ap to escape and fire at soldiers who chased them. The minister said the fire was returned causing casualties. Among them was Mr Ap. [Text] [BK100900 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 10 Jun 84]

CSO: 4200/838

PARLIAMENT RESTRICTIONS ON LION DANCE QUESTIONED

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 10 Mar 84 p 3

[Text] Lee Lam Thye, MP for Kuala Lumpur Bandar and concurrently adviser to the Selangor-Kuala Lumpur Lion Dance Troupe Federation, plans to ask Parliament when it meets next Monday to rescind all unreasonable restrictions on lion dance performances so that this Chinese culture will enjoy the right to freedom of movement.

He pointed out that Chinese lion dances, performed during the Lunar New Year and other occasions, are still harassed by the police, and this harassment imposes restrictions on the activities and development of this Chinese heritage. This means that the constitutionally-guaranteed equal position of various cultures cannot be realized.

Therefore, Mr Lee said, he will reaffirm in Parliament the appeal of the ethnic-Chinese citizens to the government to put into practice our constitution in word and spirit, by freely letting lion dances carry on. He expressed hope that he will get the support of other Parliament members representing the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], Malaysian People's Movement [GERAKAN] and United People's Party [UPP], as proof of their promise of safeguarding the national culture of the Chinese society.

Mr Lee said that he would ask the minister of home affairs to revoke the ridiculous stipulation that a lion dance can be performed on a certain occasion only in the presence of a ministerial-level guest. In addition, he would ask the authorities to simplify and unify the procedures for filing applications for permits for Lunar New Year activities.

9300

CSO: 4205/58

KIN KWOK: JAPAN SHOULD REVIEW ITS 'CLOSED DOOR' POLICY

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 7 Mar 84 p 2

[Commentary]

[Text] Apart from being harassed by nitpickers in some advanced countries, our products are also faced with the "closed door" policy of several other countries. The latter treat us worse, for they simply regard our products as nonexistent. Consequently, it would serve no purpose for us to analyze and improve our products to meet the requirements of these countries which adopt a derogatory attitude on developing countries in the first place. What makes us all the more furious is that, while we are promoting our "Learn from the East" policy, Japan turns out to be one of the countries which pursue a closed-door policy against our exports.

In so doing, Japan is as good as choking itself to death and leading its own trade toward a deadend. As pointed out by Prime Minister Mahathir, a closed-door policy may bring in short-term profits, but in the long run it will evoke ill effects to the country concerned.

The Japanese government should understand that its achievements as an economic power are partly attributable to its accomplishments in the Southeast Asian region, without which Japan could not have reached its current world position today.

Japanese goods are mostly marketed in Southeast Asia, from which region Japanese traders have absorbed huge amounts of foreign exchange to enrich their own country. However, if the products of these countries cannot make a breakthrough on foreign markets, how can their inhabitants have the power to buy Japanese commodities? If such a situation should occur, it would no longer be possible for Japan to become strong and prosperous. Japan would be eating its own bitter fruit, with nobody else to blame.

As an astute nation, Japan should understand that any one-sided trade cannot last long. Therefore, a farsighted country should stress over and over again the importance of reciprocal trade.

We do not deny that products of a developing country such as ourselves are far from perfect and still below international standards. Some of our products cannot fulfill 100 percent of the requirements of industrialized countries. But this is of a temporary nature, and things will improve with the passing of time. For example, when a baby is born into this world, he cannot walk by itself; he must go through several stages in life before he can start walking, and thence running. That's elementary. By the same token, the products of a developing country can reach international standards after research and improvement.

Under the principle of reciprocal trade, we hope that while dumping their commodities on our market, the Japanese should also consider importing our products.

Prime Minister Mahathir has pointed out that to enable a developing country to buy more goods from an advanced country, the latter must also reciprocate by importing the products of the developing country concerned. As a matter of fact, if Southeast Asia becomes prosperous, Japan will benefit from it, because it will get more customers for its products. The greater the purchasing power of the inhabitants, the more goods they can buy.

However, Japan must not misconstrue our original motives of learning from the East as acceptance on our part to become a market for Japanese products. We want to absorb new work outlook and value concepts from the East to be coordinated into our long-range industrialization plan. If we fail to reach our goal, our products will have no foreign markets, our country will remain poor and our people will have little buying power. Then it would not be easy for Japan to maintain its economic power in the world.

The Japanese authorities must not misunderstand us. We will not rob their rice bowls, if and when our products make a breakthrough on foreign markets.

9300

CSO: 4205/58

NEO YEE PAN: 'FAKE MEMBERS' ISSUE IS NOT NEW

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 6 Mar 84 p 1

[Text] Datuk Neo Yee Pan, acting president of the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], said today that the "fake party members" issue is not new, as such cases have occurred in the past 20 years.

Traditionally, he said, certain problems tend to crop up during a party election, and this time is no exception, the only difference being that certain people are deliberately exaggerating the issue this time around.

In reply to a reporter's question concerning "phantom members," Datuk Neo stressed again: "I have already said many times that any branch which is involved in faking its membership will be disbanded, and that its responsible persons will face disciplinary action."

He indicated that a roster of MCA members will be issued on 15 March. Asked whether this membership list will resolve the "fake members" dispute, Datuk Neo said: "Definitely. From this list we can ascertain which are the genuine members and which are the bogus members."

He added that he has served in the Elections Steering Committee for 15 years, during which period he encountered similar problems, so the fake membership issue poses no new problem to him.

Talking about the guidance course, he said that this was started in 1982 and was aimed at instilling party awareness and policies into the minds of new members and attracting more youngsters to join the party.

Asked whether Datuk Lee San Choon will assume the chairmanship of Multi-Purpose Holdings, Datuk Neo declined to comment, merely saying "that's your prophesy only."

9300

CSO: 4205/58

BRIEFS

SUBSIDY FOR CHINESE TEACHERS--Deputy Education Minister Datuk Dr Tan Tiong Hong pointed out today that he would try his best to revert next year's subsidy rates for Chinese-language teachers in public schools to the level of 1982. At that time Chinese teachers' subsidies were as follows: those with university qualifications received M\$25 per hour of teaching, while others with normal qualifications M\$20 per hour. Last year, the subsidy rates were reduced as follows: university-educated teachers teaching in a Chinese middle school received M\$10 per hour, while others with normal qualifications M\$7. Common Chinese-language teachers of a Chinese primary school received a subsidy of M\$5 per hour. This year, thanks to Datuk Dr Tan's effort, the subsidy rates were raised as follows: university-educated teachers received M\$15 per hour of teaching, and those with ordinary qualifications received M\$10 per hour. [Text] [Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 6 Mar 84 p 4] 9300

CSO: 4205/58

INDEPENDENCE FRONT DEMANDS REFERENDUM BEFORE 1986

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 May 84 p 8

/Text/ On behalf of the New Caledonia Independence Front, which currently has a delegation staying in Paris, Mr Roch Pidjot, associate socialist deputy, addressed a letter to his colleagues of the National Assembly 18 May. In it, he vigorously criticized the bill proposing a modification in New Caledonia's statute (LE MONDE, 13 and 14 April), the text of which is slated for initial discussion 28 May at the Palais-Bourbon. Mr Pidjot writes: "The statute proposed by the government lays the foundation for a self-determination which will inevitably lead to a neocolonial or 'Rhodesian-style' independence."

The Independence Front rejects the timetable set by the government, which plans the organization of a referendum on the political future of the territory 5 years after the new internal autonomy statute becomes effective, that is, in 1989. Mr Pidjot will back an amendment recommending that the new statute be explicitly presented as "a transition period" before "progressing to independence" and that this "transition" come to an end "24 September 1985."

In effect, the Independence Front wants the projected referendum to be organized before 1986. But they continue to lobby for a modification of the electoral law applied in the territory, to the effect that all inhabitants of New Caledonia whose mother and father were not native-born be excluded from the electoral body. The Independence Front emphasizes that this reform should be in effect before the next territorial elections, expected to take place before the end of the year.

In the event the government rejects these two points, the Independence Front delegates maintain that the Melanesian community will be compelled to boycott not only the territorial elections but also the new institutions. They do not, however, foresee breaking off dialogue with the government.

9825

CSO: 4219/46

GULF WAR ESCALATION THREATENS NATIONAL OIL SUPPLIES

'Grave Concern' Over Shipping Attacks

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 14 May 84 p 1

[Text]

The attack on a Saudi Arabian oil tanker yesterday was of "grave concern" to New Zealand, which takes about 55 percent of its oil from that source, the Minister of Energy, Mr Birch, says today.

The war between Iran and Iraq heated up earlier this week when two Kuwaiti oil tankers were attacked by aircraft in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait blamed Iran for the attacks.

Now, the 212,000-tonne Yanbu Pride, carrying a load of oil from Saudi Arabia to Brazil was attacked in the Gulf by an unidentified aircraft.

In addition to taking about 55 percent of its oil requirements from Saudi Arabia, New Zealand takes about 25 percent from Indonesia and Australia. The remaining 20 percent comes from indigenous sources such as condensate from the Taranaki gas fields and substitution programmes.

Mr Birch said efforts were already being made to lift oil production from the onshore McKee oil field in Taranaki to 5000 barrels a day by the end of this year, which represents about 6 percent of New Zealand's oil consumption. The motor fuels schemes using compressed natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas were also assisting the programme towards significant self sufficiency.

These schemes put New Zealand in a better position to weather possible Middle East oil disruptions than it had been in the past, Mr Birch said, but the conflict involving the Saudi Arabian tanker was regarded as a matter of grave concern.

"Post" questions on the Middle East situation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Cooper, had not received a response at press time.

No Involvement Planned

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 18 May 84 p 1

[Text]

New Zealand will not become involved in any escalation of the Middle East conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Cooper, said today.

While the Government was profoundly concerned at the attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf, it was reassured that no New Zealand oil supplies from the area had yet been affected. (Threat to world supplies and air cover a US option, page 5.)

In the past month, seven oil tankers have been damaged by air attacks, including vessels shipping oil from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. New Zealand's foreign policy towards the Middle East is based on our significant trading relationships with several nations there.

Exports, mainly primary produce, amount to \$500 million a year to Iran, \$40 million to Iraq and \$80

million a year to Saudi Arabia, plus millions of dollars in exports to other nations in the area.

Some 55 percent of New Zealand's oil and oil products is shipped through the Gulf.

Mr Cooper said the Iran-Iraq war was exhausting both nations, and the money spent on fighting would be better spent on their respective economies.

An escalation in the war could lead to serious disruptions in oil supplies, but in his recent meeting with the representatives of Middle East nations on the Gulf Co-operative Council, indicated a clear determination by those members to do all they could to assist in "de-escalating" the war, both on the border between the countries and in the Gulf.

Mr Cooper said he expected agencies such as the United Nations to become involved in the situation before the likes of the United States, Japan and Europe did.

The US has indicated that it does not want to step into the conflict without full support from its allies.

Oil industry sources have no immediate concern over the short-term effects on the oil supplies.

A spokesman for Shell Oil said the situation was comfortable in the short term but heavier products such as furnace oil and bitumen could become scarce if the situation continued for any time.

CSO: 4200/824

'LOST COMMAND' MEMBER LINKED TO ELECTION TERRORISM

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 31 May 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] A member of the Lost Command, the notorious para-military unit operating in Mindanao and Samar has been tagged by an opposition leader as one of those who allegedly directed and participated in massive frauds, terrorism and cheating during the May 14 elections in Cebu province.

Former Comelec commissioner Casimiro Madarang, Jr., leader of the opposition party 'Pundok Sugboanon' said that the picture of what the administration party did in the last elections for the national assembly is becoming clearer now after information he said coming from reliable sources have started coming in.

Marang belied charges made by the KBL leaders in Cebu concerning the alleged manufacture of spurious duplicate-election returns by the dominant opposition to substantiate fraud charges hurled by the opposition against the KBL party here.

He said that "they are the ones committing the irregularities and should not toss the blame on any of the oppositionists."

He said that Durano and the KBL's should better watch out when they start substantiating their charges of alleged terrorism, vote buying and frauds committed in the last Batasan polls. He said that they have lined-up numerous witnesses who would be able to prove their contention.

Marang also bared that he has aligned himself with opposition Panaghiusa leaders and made available all his copies of election returns from every precinct of municipalities and cities in Cebu province. He also said that he is in direct and constant consultations with them for common front against the KBL.

Meanwhile, the former Comelec brass said that they are awaiting the decision on their petitions filed to annul and prevent the canvassing of returns from contested areas in the province. Both the KBL and opposition parties have contested election returns in 50 towns and cities of the 48 municipalities and 4 cities in the province of Cebu.

Panaghiusa leaders earlier were hopeful that the poll body would grant their move to initiate new elections for the province claiming that there was allegedly a failure to hold fair, honest and clean elections last May 14 here. The case is still pending decision by the poll body in Manila.

The issue before Comelec, according to Madarang is whether they would accept the opposition's offer to testimonial evidence or would stick on deciding the case on its merits based on sworn statements to expedite matters. He conceded however, that the canvassing of election returns would have to be resumed meanwhile and disclosed that they will present their objections on a precinct to precinct level.

The other protesting opposition group, Panaghiusa had indicated that they would bring the matter to the Supreme Court and ask that new elections would be held for Cebu province. A spokesman for the same group said that they will field their partisans in administration bailiwicks and other areas of the province to prevent a repetition of frauds and minimize cheating and other irregularities here.

CSO: 4200/844

Violence Feared

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 31 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mike Yncino]

[Text] Violence is expected to erupt at the Visayan Glass Factory in Guadalupe, Cebu City, after a dialogue to settle the dispute between the parties to the labor row collapsed following the insistence of the workers from the strike-bound firm to reinstate their leader Wenceslao Badayos and four other before settlement of the dispute.

Maj. Alberto Olario, commanding officer of the 341st PC Company, who played as peacemaker in the more than 2-hour dialogue, said that he will still confer with management, representatives of both the Associated Labor Union (ALU) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to find means to diffuse the situation. [as published]

Peace talks yesterday with management, ALU representatives, and a labor arbiter virtually collapsed when striking workers belonging to the Alyansa sa Mamumuo--Sugbo (AMA-Sugbo) insisted to disallow free entry and exit of materials such as fuel needed for the company's normal operations. The AMA leaders after consultations with their members agreed, however, to allow workers and food into the Visayan Glass Factory compound after appeals by Olario and NLRC Arbiter Vito Minoria for them to leave their barricades temporarily pending the solution of the case before the NLRC.

The National Labor Relations Commission in Manila yesterday issued a temporary 20-day restraining order enjoining the strikers from preventing free ingress and egress to the industrial compound. The Labor Commissioners apparently acted urgently to diffuse the tension prevailing at the area as well as to prevent management from carrying out their threat to close shop at midnight to night. If the dispute would remain unresolved.

Officials from the management led by David Chu and Vic Sabarre had indicated that if no fuel reaches the company today, they will be forced to initiate a cooling off process of their kiln-furnaces to prevent larger damage. They explained that unless bunker oil would be supplied them, their furnaces

made of by refractory materials would crack up and be badly damaged causing a shut-down which could last until a year or so. They also disclosed that forthcoming financial arrangements may be cancelled including important deliveries of needed imported materials.

Maj. Olario rightfully set aside the implementation of the restraining order by NLRC apparently to prevent bloodshed which is expected once the pickets and barricades set up by more than 300 factory workers would be broken.

During the dialogue held at the factory, representatives of AMA led by their Vice-chairman Socorro Mirabueno and Edmundo Barrientos and 5 other strike leaders stood their ground to continue the protest in spite of the NLRC restraining order if Badayos and 4 other strike leaders are not reinstated back to their bs.

While compan. representatives acceded to the demand by workers for the reinstatement of Badayos temporarily pending resolution of a case before the Labor relations commission, ALU representatives held back saying that they allegedly have sufficient grounds for dismissing Badayos for alleged acts inimical to the interest of ALU. Legally AMA has no personality to stage a strike since the collective bargaining contract is between ALU and management only.

However, all the AMA members at the strike-bound firm are all members of ALU.

Union Executive Says Strike Illegal

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 31 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Text] Atty. Catalino Dorono, Senior Vice-President of the Associated Labor Union (ALU) yesterday said that the workers' strike at the Visayan Glass Factory in Guadalupe, this city, is illegal.

In a press conference held at the ALU-VIMCONTU Bldg. at Pier 1, Atty. Dorono disclosed that the strikers at the glass firm are only a minority of around 600 workers. Most of these workers are members of ALU, Dorono said.

According to Dorono, a filed first with the union be filed first with the union before any strike could be staged by the workers. The failure of filing said notice would constitute a violation of union policy and rules, thus making any strike unlawful. [paragraph as published]

Workers belonging to the Alyansa sa mga Mamumuo (AMA-Sugbo), who are also members of ALU, picketed the glass company since late last week in protest against the dismissal from work of Wenceslao Badayos, the Vice-President of Local 10 ALU. The AMA-Sugbo-initiated strike does not have the consent and coordination of ALU, Dorono said.

Dorono further said that Badayos was expelled from the union only after thorough investigation and hearings were made in which he was found guilty of committing some acts considered "minical" to the union. After being expelled from the union he was also recommended to the firm for dismissal from work.

Responding the question on what ALU should do to immediately settle the strike, Assemblyman Januario Seno, labor representative to the Batasang Pambansa, who was also present in the press conference, said that help from the Labor Ministry is necessary to possibly bring the strikers and the glass firm into a peaceful negotiation.

It appears that immediate settlement of the conflict must be hastened considering the fact that families of the workers who are not involved in the strike are adversely affected, and furthermore the conflict may probably escalate into bloodshed.

CSO: 4200/844

PIMENTEL ON OPPOSITION ASSEMBLY, ROLE FOR 'PARLIAMENT OF STREETS'

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 29 May 84 pp 1, 10

[Article by Vic Sumalinog]

[Text] A PDP-Laban assemblyman-elect yesterday said the opposition hopes to institute reforms in the present government through what he termed as a joint effort of the Parliament in the Batasan and the "parliament in the streets."

Aquilino "Nene" Pimentel, Cagayan de Oro City Mayor and newly elected assemblyman for the city's lone district, disclosed the opposition scheme at a conference attended by Davao city media representatives at a local hotel yesterday morning.

Pimentel said forcing the present administration to adapt reforms as seen fit for the people could not just be left alone to the opposition assemblymen in the Batasan.

He claimed that while they may be able to work with independent minded lawmakers from among the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) the number of oppositionist may not just be enough to muster support to any measure intended for such reforms.

Pimentel averred that one potent weapon which could hasten the desired changes in the present government set-up as these are being envisioned by the opposition is the continued expression of vigilance by the people themselves.

He intimated that should the people appear always ready to go into collective peaceful action and express their sentiments in what he calls "through a parliament of the streets", this will surely help pressure President Marcos to accede to the demands of the people.

Pimentel who is now the national chairman of the opposition group PDP-Laban, also disclosed during the same press conference the following:

*His trip in Davao City is in connection with his effort to consolidate the "genuine opposition" to be able to come up with a plan of action for the opening session of the Batasan;

*A merger of the PDP-Laban and the Unido is held very unlikely. His party is not in any way under the Unido but during the last Batasan elections it was trying to work with it because it was the cry of the people;

*PDP-Laban assemblymen will not boycott the Batasan session. Instead they will attend in order to protect the interest of the people; and

*One of the best laws ever passed by a Philippine legislature in the country including the defunct Congress, was passed by the outgoing interim Batasan. It was the election code which governed the May 14 Batasan elections.

At the same time the PDP-Laban stalwart revealed that among the priority measures he would introduce in the regular Batasan are:

*Return of the police control to the local governments;

*Audit of the amount paid as rentals for the U.S. bases in the country, and an accounting of all the loans acquired during the Marcos martial law regime;

*A Batasan investigation on the unexplained deaths and the huge military budget which grows also annually;

*Measures going to a moratorium in the payment of loans of the country until such time that our economic situation will allow us to do so. Pimentel cited as example the loans contracted by bhina during Chiang, Kai-Shek's regime which he said was paid only very recently by the government of the People's Republic of China.

One major announcement made by Pimentel, however, is his proposal to legitimize the communist movement by introducing a bill which would repeal the anti-communist law.

He said this way it would prevent a violent struggle between the government forces and those identified with the communist movement.

CSO: 4200/844

DAVAO PC COMMANDERS RELIEVED POLICE TAKE OVER POSTS

City Residents Hail Move

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 27 May 84 p 1

[Article by Flor Colina]

[Text] The Davao metropolitan district command (METRODISCOM) yesterday relieved all PC officers manning police substations in Davao City and replaced them with police officers.

Col. Geronimo Valderrama, Davao Metrodiscom chief, effected the revamp after consultations with Brig. Gen. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, RECOM 11 commanding general.

Major Taugan Kadalim, central police station commander, was replaced by Capt. Ernesto Macasaet who was holding the position prior to his study grant in Laguna last year.

Major Amparo Cabigas, station commander of Calinan, was reassigned by the Metrodiscom which designated Cpl. Maol as officer-in-charge.

Capt. Leonilo Dalut, station commander of Talomo, turned over his post to Lt. Felicisimo Balangaoan.

City residents hailed the revamp move made by Gen. Tan-Gatue and Col. Valderrama. The move also ended apprehensions by members of the INP who earlier said they wanted police officers to be assigned to police substations.

Move Called 'Communist Inspired'

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 27 May 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Major-Gen. Delfin Castro, SouthCom chief, described yesterday as "communist-inspired" moves to separate the police from the constabulary.

Castro made his reply in the wake of reported moves by some policemen to go on mass leave in disgust over their integration to the military "which has made them easy target not only for dissidents of the New People's Army but

also of the military men themselves on whose toes they have stepped on."

Castro said that this is an intrigue that is being fomented by the communists so that the police and the military would fight each other instead of uniting against the communists.

Castro added that even in the various agencies of the military, the communists have also succeeded in intriguing them against each other so that the military would not only be divided but would distrust each other.

This is a communist ploy which has succeeded in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Castro said.

At the same time, Brig. Gen. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, chief of the PC regional command and INP head, denied rumors that some of the policemen killed in Davao city were killed by military men, specially by the "R-2."

Tan-Gatue said that this is not true, saying that the PC and the police have been working together as a team in the campaign against lawless elements.

Calling this as another communist strategy, Tan-Gatue admitted that there were instances where fatal mistakes are committed, such as during military operations against the enemies of the state, but these incidents are isolated and were "unavoidable mistakes that happen."

Gen. Castro, on the other hand, said that the terrain of Davao city is too wide against the dissidents unlike in Vietnam where he had fought with the Americans against the communists.

Here in Davao city, Gen. Castro said, dissidents can easily mix with residents in the slum areas or go to the foothills of Mt. Apo to hide.

Besides, Gen. Castro added that the "human rights" movement in Davao city is very active and the military can not just pick any suspect in any given killing of a soldier or a policeman.

CSO: 4200/844

TASK FORCE ON DETAINEES REPORTS 125 TORTURED

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 24 May 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] Beatings, manhandling and candlelight burning were reportedly employed in some 125 torture incidents in Mindanao.

This was disclosed by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP-Mindanao) which is based here.

"Torture remains an instrument of military terror and repression," TFDP says in its semi-annual report for the period of six months last year.

Though there was a decline in arrests, torture was high in Ozamis and Tandag with 28 and 26 cases, respectively. In previous documents, torture incidents in Tandag reached as high as 100.

Other places with torture problems are: Butuan--18; Dipolog--9; and Tagum--9. TFDP also noted an increase in torture cases in Pagadian (5 to 9) and Iligan (2 to 7).

The report narrates a case of a church worker who was involved in labor concerns. It states: "He was arrested June 22 in Iligan City. During the first week of his detention in an unknown safehouse, the churchman was stripped naked, handcuffed and interrogated in air-conditioned room. He was beaten and manhandled. Candlelight burning was also used on him. For the next weeks and months, he was confined solitarily in a small windowless room and denied access to relatives and lawyers".

The report says that there was a significant sharp decline of torture cases as compared to the previous documents. However, there is a significant rise in salvaging cases.

The TFDP disclosure came in the wake of the Amnesty International statements, regarding the widespread use of torture in the Philippines and in other 99 countries.

In a report issued this month, Amnesty International says "torture is being widely used in the 1980s to intimidate, punish or extract confessions from parishioners around the world".

AI, an independent human rights group based in London, gathered data on more than 2,600 cases of torture from victims, witnesses, doctors, medical and court records, and former security personnel who took part in torture sessions.

In the Philippines, AI says that systematic torture have continued in a pattern set since 1972. Torture often takes place outside of legal places of detention and often has been accompanied by beating, electric shock and sexual abuse. Prisoners would then be turned over to authorized place of detention.

CSO: 4200/844

MINING CORPORATION FACES ECONOMIC, REBEL PROBLEMS

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 23 May 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] North Davao Mining Corporation (NDMC), the largest mining company in Mindanao, is facing a very uncertain future which could have unfortunate effects on hundreds of its employees, their families and on dozens of businesses which supply this large copper producer.

While officials of NDMC maintain that the company intends to continue operating, as long as the economics permit, employees are apprehensive as several factors beyond the control of NDMC could cause closure of the mines in Davao del Norte province.

The price of copper being one, the cost of operations another, and the frequent attacks by terrorists and bandits, a very strong third, and last but not the least, the unreliability of power.

Company Profile

NDMC operates a small gold mine at Hijo, Mabini and a large copper mine and mill at Amacan, Maco, Davao del Norte. The Amacan mine with a design capacity of 25,000 tons per day, commenced operations in August 1982.

NDMC employs over 200 persons at the Hijo Mine, about 1,350 in Amacan and its Panabo pier installation, and 150 at its offices in Davao City and Manila a total of 1,700 persons.

NDMC has built schools, roads, workers and staff housing facilities, water systems and a 105-kilometer powerline to provide an infrastructure needed to support operation of these mines. The powerline eventually will be used in the near future to provide electricity to a number of baranggays in Maco Municipality, NDMC maintains more than 50 kilometers of municipal roads including the placing of many culverts and the continued repair and replacement of many bridges, large and small, along these roads. The result of these NDMC activities, as well as the monthly payroll of over P4 million, and the millions of pesos value of local purchases in the Davao area, have had significant effects on the local economy and livelihood of families in Davao del Norte and in Davao City. Also considerable foreign exchange is derived from the enterprise since much of the concentrates produced by the company are exported.

Adverse Factors

In recent months, adverse factors have threatened the existence of the company. Foremost is the recurring problem of terrorist and bandit activity in Davao del Norte. During the last six months, NDMC facilities and equipment have been attacked six times by these hostile elements. Millions of pesos of equipment have been thoughtlessly destroyed and much of this equipment cannot be replaced, due to import restrictions and lack of funds.

There has also been a substantial loss of production due to these activities which has brought the company perilously close to a suspension of its operations due to its marginal financial resources being unable to sustain below profitable operations.

Whilst government forces can successfully maintain the peace and order in general, it is not possible to predict sudden attacks by terrorists or bandits. Company employees are apprehensive that the continuation of such depredations could force an indefinite suspension of its operations, especially since metal prices are as close to operation's cost as they are today.

Another critical factor concerns the availability and amount of power supplied by the National Power Corporation (NPC). The shortfall of power production experienced by NPC and the restrictions they have had to place on the supply of power to the mines have a direct effect upon the amount of copper produced. Due to the lack of power and frequent interruption in its supply, as many as 14 times in 24 hours, more than 25% of NDMC's production was lost in 1983.

Due to import restrictions imposed by the Nation's current financial crisis, the cost of materials and supplies has risen much more rapidly than the rate anticipated, virtually wiping out the operating marginal profit.

Consequences

Should NDMC be forced to close down due to any or all of these factors, the result would be catastrophic for their employees who would be out of work, for the municipalities in Davao del Norte, and for the many large and small businesses which depend on sales to NDMC. In addition, millions of dollars in foreign exchange would be lost. Even the operation of PASAR, the national smelter, would be seriously affected since NDMC is one of the largest suppliers of concentrates to this smelter. At this time, NDMC has instituted programs to reduce costs and conserve energy and has not indicated that a shutdown of operations is planned. Nevertheless, the apprehensions of many people, whose sole livelihood depends upon NDMC staying in business, would be affected by such a shutdown, can be allayed only by the firming up of the power supply from NPC and to a larger extent the cessation of terrorists' raid upon their properties.

CEBU OPPOSITION BROADCASTER BARRED FROM MANILA PROGRAM

Cebu City VASAYAN HERALD in English 31 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Text] Radio commentator, columnist and opposition leader Migs Enriquez, Jr. was banished anew from the airplanes last night when their program host VIC Abangan was ordered stopped by the station management in Manila.

In an interview with VISAYAN HERALD, Migs lamented the closure order which was served without due notice and explanation and branded the management order as arbitrary and designed to suppress press freedom in this part of the country.

Migs said that the action of the management to bar him from the airplanes is unfair considering that no explanation was given except for his being in the program. "They are persecuting me," Migs added.

Migs bewailed this recent move to muzzle him from practicing his profession as a broadcaster. "While I have never incited the people to violate our laws, I cannot understand why I'm being singled out while other broadcasters are running roughshod against KBP rules and regulations," Migs said.

Migs run as an independent opposition candidate for the Batasan in Cebu City and lost the contest last May 14. Opposition leaders Tony Cuenco and Celina Fernan won in that election.

Migs is a duly accredited commentator and analyst of the Kapisanan Nga Mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). According to KBP rules and regulations, members are entitled to due process, meaning that formal charges must be filed first against them and they are given an opportunity to answer and present evidence in their behalf before they could be yanked out from the airplanes.

CSO: 4200/844

RAMOS, PIMENTEL ON RETURN OF POLICE TO LOCAL CONTROL

Ramos: Move Unconstitutional

Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 24 May 84 p 5

[Text] Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, chief of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and director general of the Integrated National Police (INP), yesterday said any move to return supervision and control of police to mayors would require a constitutional revision.

He said that under the constitution, the INP is under the control of the PC with regards to appointment and management.

At this point in time, Ramos, said the country cannot afford a fragmented police force, considering varied threats the nation is facing. Even foreign countries have long discarded the village or town police concept in favor of a national police system, he added.

Under the old system, the PC/INP chief revealed, some towns could not even afford to pay the minimum wage to their policemen.

In contrast, he said, integration of the police in Aug. 1975 has resulted in increase in pay and standardization of weapons and other equipment.

Ramos said that the INP has set up several police training centers in the country's various regions.

He also cited establishment of the Philippine National Police Academy to train future officers of the country's police force.

Earlier some governors and mayors urged the return of police under their jurisdiction.

Pimentel To Sponsor Bill

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 31 May 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Vic Sumalinog]

[Text] Newly elected opposition assemblyman Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City disclosed during his trip in Davao early this week he will file in the Batasan a bill that would lead to the return of police control to the local governments.

This the opposition stalwart revealed to the Davao media even as he also surfaced basically the same problems the policemen in his city are experiencing as those which are obtaining among their counterparts in Davao City as an offshoot of the integration.

Pimentel said that under the intregation scheme the policemen are so demoralized.

Hence, he said, the citizens could not expect from the policeman full compliance to his sworn duties.

The opposition lawmaker-elect also claimed that as a result of the integration every city and every town are required to allot 18 percent of their gross income to the national government to be able to sustain the national scheme.

However, he averred, so much has been asked of the local governments but what has been siphoned down to the local police units are not commensurate to what was given off.

Among the common problems besetting both Cagayan de Oro and Davao City, Pimentel claimed, is the practice of assigning virtually a "stranger" to head a police unit or station.

Pimentel said this system often resulted to very slow response for police assistance. He cited an incident in Cagayan wherein the station commander had a hard time answering a call for assistance because he does not know where Divisoria in Cagayan de Oro City is.

As regards the 18 percent of the city's income being remitted to the national coffers for the sustenance of the integration, he went on to say that the amount would even allow his city to procure battle tanks for his policemen.

Pimentel said he believes of the importance of returning the control of policemen to the local executives.

Thus, he felt it should become as his pet resolution once the Batasan opens its regular session this June.

CSO: 4200/845

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ABAD SANTOS RAPS MARCOS GOVERNMENT

Manila THE MANILA PAPER in English 28 May 84 p 8

[Text]

Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos who, at 68, is not too old to dream about a lot of things, shared some of them with the 523 successful bar examinees at last week's oath-taking of the new lawyers.

In an unusual address, Abad Santos startled the audience at the PICC when he delivered a veiled dig at government leaders, politicians, technocrats, police officers, civil war combatants, and the high court itself.

He told the new lawyers he has dreamt that:

— "soon we shall see the dawn and enjoy fully once again all of the inalienable rights guaranteed to us by the Constitution.

— "we shall be able to extricate ourselves from the economic mess which engulfs us and we can be as prosperous as Singapore, Hongkong,

the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea whose natural resources are meager compared to ours but have no debt problems.

— "there be a more equitable distribution of wealth in our country so that there will be neither paupers nor oligarchs.

— "any person who is willing and able can find work which will provide him with just wages so that he and his family can lead decent and satisfying lives.

— "the slogan *isang bansa, isang diwa* will become a reality; we will have a truly united nation free from senseless fratricidal strife because our *bansa* will be based on a truly just society.

— "in our world of interdependence, we will not be too unduly dependent on other nations so that we can manage our internal affairs

free from their intervention

— "law enforcement officers will act as civilized human beings and refrain from using unnecessary force on their fellowmen in the performance of their duties.

— "the saying 'those who have less in life should have more in law' shall not be a mere credo, an empty concept, but a working formula to uplift the disadvantaged.

— "those who hold public office will act as servants of the people and not lackeys of oligarchs and self-seeking politicians.

— "we shall have elections without cheating.

— "we shall have elections without terrorism.

— "we shall have elections without overspending.

— "the Supreme Court will better be known for its dissenting rather than its assenting opinions."

CSO: 4200/844

BANK PRIME RATE RISES TO 24 PERCENT

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 12 May 84 p 10

[Article by Rajendra Bajpai]

[Text] THE average short-term price rate of Manila commercial banks has risen two percentage points to 24 percent in recent days and interbank lending rates for overnight call money have moved up to about 60 percent from about 45 percent last week, dealers said.

They said rates have risen because of the higher cost of borrowings following last month's one-percentage point increase to 24 percent in the minimum reserve requirement of commercial banks.

The assistant vice-president of a local bank said interbank rates soared Wednesday because some banks miscalculated their reserve position and are now borrowing to meet deficits.

"One very strong foreign bank was borrowing today at 45 percent while some of the weaker banks were paying even more," he said. "It seems some banks miscalculated and even the ones which looked very comfortable are borrowing in the market."

A chief dealer with another bank said the tight money situation may also be a result of rumors of a devaluation after national assembly elections on May 14.

THE dealer said some banks are not turning over their dollar receipts to the Central Bank in the hope of getting more pesos in event of a devaluation and this means some banks are short of pesos.

The assistant vice-president of the local bank said prime rates had to be raised because the cost of borrowing has increased with reserves deposited with the Central Bank getting only three percent interest compared with 19 percent or more with time deposits.

He said the prime rate is expected to stay high for some time.

Interbank rates were as low as four percent a few weeks ago.

When the minimum reserve requirement was increased by 1.5 percent in December interbank rates rose to as high as 55 percent and bankers said they expect rates to stay between 20 and 25 percent for the rest of the year.

They also expect a further increase in the minimum reserve requirement.

The latest increase, aimed at reducing money supply, is estimated to have frozen about P1 billion, they said.

DEALERS said many banks have defaulted in depositing their share with the Central Bank and have asked it to temporarily waive penalties this entails because of the tight money situation.

The dealers said they do not expect the Central Bank to agree.

Penalties include a punitive 36 percent interest and can lead to the cancellation of a bank's license.

CSO: 4200/786

NATION PREPARES FOR NEW WAVE OF PRICE INCREASES

Penang THE STAR in English 30 May 84 p 19

[Article by Deniss Anthony]

[Text]

MANILA — Barely recovered from the last round of price increases in October, Filipinos are bucking down for a new bout of economic miseries triggered by a increase in oil prices two weeks ago. Economists have warned that inflation, now hovering near the 37 per cent mark nationwide — it was 26 per cent in December — could reach new dizzy heights. The new round of increases will come at a time when the standard of living is already eroding steadily.

First signs that harder days were ahead emerged during the run-up to the recently-concluded national assembly elections.

Fears of price increases after the polls led to a rush on supermarkets and groceries which resulted in shortages of basic commodities like rice, sugar and powdered milk and, if they were available, exorbitant prices were charged despite price controls.

But the crunch hasn't quite begun although the pinch is already being felt. Three days after the May 14 election, President Ferdinand Marcos increased levies on petroleum products, pushing up their prices by an average of 8.1 per cent.

A queue has already been formed by the industrial and service sectors seeking

rise beyond the reach of ordinary Filipinos, and he could not allow this to happen, the President said.

This argument is lost on labour organisations, which cannot accept that oil price increases are necessary at a time when there is a global oil glut.

Notwithstanding any merits of this point, it is clear that the government had to take steps to keep down imports in order to narrow the balance of trade deficit.

The problem with the Philippines is that it buys much more than it sells — for every US dollar (\$2.30) it pays out, it earns only US 75 cents (\$1.73).

Mindful of this unhealthy state of affairs, the government has embarked on self-sufficiency programmes but foreign bankers in Manila doubt this will be enough to put matters right.

The talk in town is that another currency devaluation is imminent, something the International Monetary Fund is reportedly demanding as one condition for extending a US\$650 million (\$1.5 billion) credit line needed to service the Philippines' foreign debts of more than US\$26 billion (\$59.8 billion).

Filipino economist Alejandro Lichauco predicts that the next devaluation could be anything up to twice the current exchange rate of 14 pesos to US\$1. Since last June, the Philippine currency has been de-

valued by 75 per cent.

First in line were the jeepney drivers on whom much depends in moving Manila's eight million people.

They are seeking a increase of 11 per cent, claiming that the oil price increases have eaten 35 per cent out of their incomes. But owners have followed suit, and so would other transport operators.

The national power corporation indicated that it wanted a 30 per cent rise in rates or else it might have to stop on-going development projects.

The government has said no to this but admits that price adjustments will be inevitable in some cases to keep industry viable.

The oil price increase has taken on a political tone. Opposition leaders have accused the government of being vindictive, saying that the price increase decision was the result of election losses suffered by the ruling party, especially in Manila.

While admitting that the moves were politically unpalatable, Mr Marcos said it was necessary to reduce oil consumption and thereby save the government US\$500 million (\$1.15 billion) on its oil bill, which was a whopping US\$2.1 billion (\$4.83 billion) last year.

The savings could be used to import raw materials needed to keep vital industries going and preserve jobs, he added.

The prices of the most basic commodities would soon

valued by 75 per cent.

Business and labour leaders have warned that a new devaluation will be difficult to weather.

Even without it, prices are already escalating. Many shudder to think what it will be like if the peso is further devalued.

Many companies which have survived the economic crisis so far could face collapse as essential imported raw essentials will become more expensive. If they survive, the consumers will have to pay the price but if they don't, it will wreak havoc on employment.

As it is, more than 40,000 workers have been laid off either temporarily or permanently in Manila alone in the first four months of this year, according to official statistics. During the same period, 1,346 companies applied to close down temporarily or for good. Then there are the 70,000 who lost jobs last year due to the closure of 980 firms.

A study by a private group, the Centre for Research and Communication, predicted that about 300,000 workers in the top 1,000 corporations here would be laid off this year.

The figure could be higher because the study does not take into account the smaller companies which face a bigger threat of collapse.

The problem is exacerbated by the roughly 800,000 new entrants into the labour force each year, including several hundred thousand college graduates.

BIR ADOPTS BLACK MARKET CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 May 84 p 1

[Text]

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) will recognize the black-market exchange rate of US dollars and other foreign currencies in determining the tax liabilities of producers.

Revenue Deputy Commissioner Romulo M. Villa said the BIR has drafted a new set of rules setting a higher exchange rate of P21.50 to \$1 instead of the official P14 to \$1, as the basis for computing the producers' tax obligations.

Villa said the higher rate will apply to pre-paid importations as

prescribed under Central Bank's (CB) Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks (MAAB) No. 50 and CB regulations covering so-called "no-dollar" imports.

No-dollar imports refer to gifts, donations, and raw materials granted by foreign firms to their local affiliates.

MAAB No. 50 allows authorized agent banks to accept pre-payment in any acceptable foreign currency of import letters of credit covering essential producers' items for domestic use and import requirements for re-export.

CSO: 4200/786

JAPANESE TRADE WITH MANILA DROPS, RP SURPLUS NOTED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 May 84 p 16

[Text]

Philippine trade with Japan resulted in a complete turnaround in the first quarter of 1984 over that of 1983 from a deficit of \$89.0 million to a surplus of \$69.4 million, as shown by Japanese customs clearance statistics released recently by the Japan Trade Center (JETRO), Manila office.

Total trade between the two countries, however, decreased by 18.2 per cent from \$746.1 million in the first quarter of 1983 to \$610.3 million in 1984.

Japan's exports to the Philippines (on an f.o.b. basis) likewise declined by 35.2 per

cent from \$417.5 million in the first quarter of 1983 to \$270.4 million in 1984.

JETRO officials explained that the overall decline in Philippine imports was due to marked decreases in the imports of general including agricultural machinery, automobile and motorcycle parts, raw materials such as chemicals and metals, and consumer items like rubber tires.

On the other hand, Japan's imports from the Philippines (on a c.i.f. basis) increased by 3.4 per cent from \$328.6 million in the first quarter of 1983 to \$339.8 million in 1984.

CSO: 4200/786

NPA KILLS 24 IN LUZON, MINDANAO RAIDS, AMBUSHES

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 May 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Twenty-four persons, 19 of them belonging to the military establishment, were killed in ambushes and raids believed staged by New People's Army (NPA) members in Zamboanga del Norte and Sur, Misamis Oriental, and Albay, it was reported yesterday.

The biggest casualties on the government side were recorded in an ambush staged in Mutya, Zamboanga del Norte, where six government troopers were killed, and a raid in Labuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, where eight members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) were slain.

Nine persons, including six government troopers and three New People's Army (NPA) terrorists, were killed Wednesday in an encounter in Barangay Albenda, Mutya, Zamboanga del Norte, according to a report received yesterday in Camp Crame.

The six fatalities on the government side led by Sgt. Rabbi Redesmo Varte were suffered in an ambush staged by the NPAs.

The government troopers also killed three unidentified NPAs in the encounter.

The ambushers ran away with one M-16 Armalite rifle, one M-2 rifle and assorted bullets of the slain soldiers.

CSO: 4200/786

AUSTRALIAN PAPER REVIEWS 'SINISTER PATTERN' IN AQUINO CASE

Perth THE WEST AUSTRALIAN in English 4 May 84 p 26

[Article by Garth Alexander]

[Text] MANILA, Thurs--A sinister pattern of kidnappings and killings is stopping key witnesses testifying before a commission investigating the assassination of Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino.

The head of the armed forces and another senior officer have been implicated in one of the kidnappings.

Mr Aquino was shot in the head last August while in the custody of an elite escort of army marksmen at Manila Airport. Although 15 aircraft mechanics stood nearby, none has admitted seeing the actual shooting and two have fled from the country for fear that what they did see could endanger their lives.

General Fabian Ver, the armed-forces chief, has reiterated army contentions that Mr Aquino was killed by a communist assassin, Rolando Galman, who was himself instantly shot dead by the military escort.

He told the five-man inquiry that the assassination was party of a communist conspiracy.

The shooting, popularly blamed on the army, sparked a series of riots last September and October in which more than a dozen people were killed.

General Ver, a former chauffeur and bodyguard of President Marcos, denied charges that he ordered the arrest of Galman's widow, who has not been seen since January 29, and two of Galman's women friends, who have not been seen since September 4, last year. All three women were seen being taken away by armed men.

One month after the assassination, Brig-Gen. Balthazar Aguirre, intelligence chief of the Philippine constabulary, which was the main military body investigating the killing, died in a bizarre highway accident in which his vehicle was crushed between two heavy trucks.

Terrified

The official inquiry into the Aquino case was getting nowhere until a terrified aviation mechanic, Ramon Balang, testified that he had seen Galman, unarmed and smiling at the soldiers moments after the assassination and seconds before he (Galman) was gunned down.

Balang said he had decided to testify because army officers were trying to persuade him to "meet President Marcos" and he was afraid that they intended to kidnap or harm him or his brother. The brother of another witness, a newspaper photographer, had been mysteriously killed three days after the photographer testified.

As the inquiry draws to a close (for want of any more willing witnesses), Mrs Corazon Agrava, the chairman, despondently observed last week that none of the 120 witnesses so far questioned including the military escort, has admitted actually seeing Mr Aquino shot.

She was "praying for a miracle" and still believed that there was "someone out there" who could tell exactly what happened.

But she confessed she was "scared of the consequences" because she could not guarantee the protection of such a witness "for the rest of his life."

CSO: 4200/786

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

NPA HOLDS HOSTAGES--In Claveria, Cagayan, heavily armed NPA terrorists were reported holding hostage about 50 workers whom they took captive after attacking their camp at the Tagat Industries farm. Cagayan PC [Philippine Constabulary] Commander Colonel Tirso Gador dispatched two PC companies to Claveria to rescue the hostages. Report reaching Camp Crame in Manila said the workers of the Tagat farm fought the terrorists before they were captured. It was not immediately known if there were any casualties in the fighting. [Text] [HK250813 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 24 May 84]

BASILAN MNLF CHIEFS SURRENDER--In Basilan, 75 field commanders of the Basilan Revolutionary Committee of the Moro National Liberation Front surrendered yesterday [3 June] to Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. The 75 commanders were under Jerry Salapudin, the head of the Basilan Committee who surrendered earlier. Enrile said the surrender of Salapudin was a severe blow to the MNLF. Salapudin, who is top MNLF commander in Basilan, has over 1,000 men under his command. With his surrender, only four Muslim rebel commanders are left operating in Mindanao under the Nur Misuari faction: Al-Haji Murad and Boy Hashim in Cotabato, and Alim Azziz and Commander Nara in Lanao Del Sur. The rest of the MNLF commanders belong to the Salamat and (Pundato) factions which do not favor secession. Following the surrender of Salapudin's field commanders, Minister Enrile said the government will provide scholarships for Salapudin's men who want to go to school, a permanent resettlement area for the group in San (Pilit), Basilan, and the assignment of teachers in schools at the settlement. [Text] [HK040416 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2330 GMT 3 Jun 84]

PROVINCIAL POLICE COMMANDER AMBUSHED--The provincial PC [Philippine Constabulary] commander of Nueva Ecija and 18 of his men cheated death June 7 when they were ambushed by NPA terrorists in Barangay (Singalat), Palayan City. Two of the terrorists were killed when the government troopers fired back. A military report said Lieutenant Colonel (Hermohenes Hebdani), Nueva Ecija provincial commander, and his men were returning to camp on board three mini-cruisers when they were fired upon by the rebels. The three vehicles managed to get out of ambush zone, giving the soldiers enough time to retaliate and kill two of the terrorists. The NPA then retreated, leaving behind a jungle pack full of clothing. [Text] [HK120731 Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 0700 GMT 12 Jun 84]

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ANNIVERSARY OF BORDER DEFENSE TROOPS MARKED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 84 pp 12-24, 61

[Article by Major General Dinh Van Tuy: "Develop the Border Defense Troops' Glorious Tradition of Victoriously Fulfilling All Missions"]

[Text] In accordance with the requirements of the enterprise of defending the homeland, defending the nation's borders, defending the headquarters organs of the Party and state, and defending the leaders, in March 1959 our country's People's Armed Public Security Forces were formed. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the government and, most directly, the Ministry of Interior, the People's Armed Public Security Forces fulfilled their missions, continually grew in our nation's glorious revolutionary struggle, and contributed, along with the entire population and the entire army, to building socialism in the north and struggling to liberate the south and unify the homeland.

After our nation's great victory in the spring of 1975 our nation was completely liberated, our homeland was completely united, and the entire nation advanced together to socialism. In view of the new requirements of the revolutionary enterprise, in order to unify the leadership of the armed forces and the fighting strength with which to solidly defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland, in October 1979, in accordance with a decision of the Party and state the People's Armed Public Security Forces were transferred to the Ministry of National Defense and became the Border Defense Troops, a component of the Vietnam People's Army. Carrying on the precious tradition of the People's Armed Public Security Forces, the Border Defense Troops have continued to fulfill the mission of being a hard-core, specialized force in the enterprise of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our national borders, and in maintaining political security and social order and safety in the border areas.

Thus our country's Border Defense Troops have been in existence for exactly 25 years, from March 1959 to March 1984. During the past 25 years, along with the development of the revolution the Border Defense Troops have matured in all regards, have been continually forged in anti-aggression combat, in the suppressing of counterrevolutionaries, in international relations, etc., and have fulfilled all missions assigned by the Party and state and created glorious traditions worthy of the name Hero of the People's Armed Forces. The generations of Border Defense cadres and men must continue to bring into play

and develop those glorious traditions in the enterprise of defending and building the homeland.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Border Defense Troops and its selection as a "Heroic Unit of the People's Armed Forces" in March 1979, Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Council of State, praised the Border Defense Troops for being "completely loyal to the Party, being completely filial toward the people, being prepared to sacrifice for the enterprise of defending the Party and the homeland, being determined to overcome all hardships and difficulties, fight bravely and resourcefully, struggle persistently and sharply, and work devotedly and creatively, having internal solidarity and unanimity, cooperating closely with the other sectors and people's armed forces, being close to the ethnic minority people, manifesting a spirit of pure international solidarity, and being determined to defeat all enemies and outstandingly fulfill all missions." (1)

That was a concentrated generalization of the tradition of the Border Defense Troops. All Border Defense Troops always carry on and develop that glorious tradition. They are absolutely loyal to the Party and the people and determined to fight and sacrifice for the enterprise of defending national sovereignty and territorial security, defend the lives and property of the people in the border areas, defend the border, and defend every sacred inch of the homeland.

The Border Defense Troops, who appeared in the revolutionary enterprise of the people, led by the glorious Vietnam Communist Party, are always devotedly oriented toward the beloved Party and the great President Ho Chi Minh, fully understand the line, stands, and policies of the Party, strictly enforce the laws of the state, and fulfill all missions assigned them. The Party and state assigned to the People's Armed Public Security Forces the mission of contributing to the defense of the border, the headquarters organs of the Party and state, the leaders, etc., and today the Border Defense Troops bear the important responsibility of being of the hard-core specialized forces in the enterprise of defending the sovereignty of our nation and the territorial integrity of its borders, and for maintaining political security and social order and safety in the border areas. That is a difficult, glorious mission which all border defense officers and men must go all-out to fulfill, with the highest effectiveness and the greatest possible effort on the part of the border defense forces and each individual. The Border Defense Troops were always deeply engraved in the heart of our beloved President Ho Chi Minh, who wrote the following admonition:

"The innumerable green mountains and blue water. We do not fear hardship in defending the homeland. Mountains are high but our cause is even higher. The ocean is deep but our will is even deeper. We must compete to win the leading banner."

That admonition of Uncle Ho has increasingly become a strong morale motive force which actuated all activities of the Border Defense Troops. During the different revolutionary periods, the absolute majority of the border defense forces work in the border areas, usually in distant, remote areas. The times when the revolution wins decisive victories and the tendency to relax appears are the times when the border defense troops set out to accept new missions.

Time has also recorded moving images. After their branch was formed in 1979, and after the complete victory of the Ho Chi inh Campaign in the spring of 1975, going against the flow of troops moving from the base areas to the lowlands, the cadres and men of the border defense forces put on their backpacks and urgently set out for all border areas, from the northernmost part of the country to the northwest, the Central Highlands, etc., to places with sparse populations and places where no one had yet set foot, and to the archipelagoes and islands, in all four seasons and in all weather conditions, and voluntarily assumed responsibility for an area, without for a minute or a second putting down their weapons. Whether manning the more than 5,000 kilometers of the country's borders or defending the key targets in the interior, the border defense troops are aware that the Party, the state, and the people have assigned them responsibility for serving as the hard core in defending the homeland's borders, defending the party, and defending the people, and regard themselves as being "bodyguards." By doing so they express the confidence in them shown by the Party, the state, and the people. They ask themselves what they must do to be worthy of that confidence and not disappoint the Party, the state, and the people. That legitimate sense of pride has helped the soldiers with green insignia to clearly determine their responsibility: complete devotion to the Party, the homeland, and the people.

The situation along the border continually develops in a variegated, complicated manner. The border defense work is a mission which lies within the common enterprise of defending the homeland and the accomplishments of the revolution. It is related to many stands and policies of the Party and laws of the state, in all spheres: political, economic, cultural, ideological, security, national defense, internal, and external. The resolution of all problems occurring there is related to the security, national defense, economy, internal affairs, and external affairs of the nation.

Therefore, it is necessary to fully understand the strategic objectives of the revolution, the stands and policies of the Party, and the laws of the state, in which the central concern is fully understanding the requirements and mission of defending the border and border areas of the nation, defending the headquarters organs of the Party and state, and defending Uncle Ho and the leadership comrades. At the same time, they had to continually understand and implement the military lines and missions, obey the lines, guidelines, and principles regarding the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, implement the Party's internal and external lines in the struggle to maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity, political security, and social order and safety in the border areas, implement the economic stands and policies in the mountain region on the islands, the ethnic policy and the religious policy, and implement and struggle to implement the agreements and conventions regarding the border and the border defense regulations.

Because they fully understood the common lines and objectives of the revolution and the requirements of the political mission assigned them, the cadres and men of the Border Defense Troops clearly realized their responsibility to the Party and the people, and to the requirement of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the homeland, so they manifested a revolutionary spirit, solidarity, and vigilance, and diligently endeavored to overcome all

difficulties and hardships, did not mind sacrifice, and continually achieved outstanding accomplishments in all regards. Those were accomplishments in organizing the defense of the border; being prepared to fight and fighting the aggressor troops; tracking down and annihilating the commandos and spies, struggling politically to defend the sovereignty of the national borders; carrying out reconnaissance against spies and reactionaries, both openly and in secret; participating in building and consolidating the Party organizations, governmental administrations, mass organizations, and public security, militia, and self-defense forces in the localities; contributing to maintaining political security and social order and safety; and defending the sovereignty, and international relations principles along the border. Especially, they did a good job of fulfilling the mission of protecting the safety of the leaders and headquarters organs of the Party and state at the central and local levels, the international delegations, and the key targets in the interior, including the protection of the leadership comrades and the organs of COSVN and the southern provinces, under the difficult, fierce circumstances of the 30 years of war experienced by our people.

The many exemplary models with regard to a spirit of heroically fulfilling missions which inspired everyone. For example, the Saigon-Gia Dinh Security Unit, which brought the forward headquarters of the Command into the very lair of the enemy during the 1968 Tet offensive, fought with extreme courage, and sacrificed to the last man; the brave men who defended the organs and cadres in fighting at Phu Yen, Soc Trang, Quang Tri, etc.; the troops who fought stubbornly at Sa Mat (Tay Ninh), Pa Prang (Dac Lac), Phu My (Kien Giang), and Po Hen (Quang Ninh).

Those manifestations reflect the unyielding loyalty of the cadres and men of the Border Defense Troops, who did not fear difficulties or hardship, or even the sacrifice of their lives, but knew only how to fulfill the missions assigned them.

The objects of the combat and struggle of the Border Defense Troops were the class enemies and the national enemies. Imperialism, expansionism, and the other reactionary powers overlooked no wily plots or schemes to sabotage our people's revolutionary undertaking and life of peaceful labor in the border areas, along the coast, and on islands. Under the leadership of the Party, the Border Defense Troops continually maintained vigilance, relied on the people, cooperated closely with the other armed forces and the public security forces, and promptly discovered all of the enemy's nefarious schemes. On the basis of evaluating the actual political, military, economic, and social situation, the developments in the general situation, and the activities of the different enemy categories in the various areas, the leadership echelons of the border defense troops drafted plans to defend the border, with specific, appropriate acts. Therefore, in previous years in the north and in recent years in the south, in many localities in the border areas all plots to foment rebellion and cause violence by reactionaries acting in the guise of religion and nationalism, and of the remnant puppet troops, were rapidly extinguished. The reactionary organizations have been gradually broken up and their leaders annihilated. The political security and social order situation in those areas have become increasingly stable.

In armed combat, the Border Defense Troops found fighting methods appropriate to the capabilities of their equipment and weapons and their dispersed, independent working conditions. By means of many small-scale, dispersed, ambush, pursuit, and surrounding tactics, combining armed combat with political offensives and basing themselves on the great strength of all the people, they achieved high effectiveness in combat against local bandits at Dong Van (Ha Giang) and Ky Son (Nghe An), and against the special agents of Chiang Kai-shek in Quang Ninh.

In the struggle against the U.S.-puppet spies and commandos the Border Defense Troops, along with the army, the public security forces, and the militia and self-defense units, quickly took the initiative and used many methods to draw their forces, facilities, and weapons from their lairs into traps we had set in advance, and used those we had caught to the enemy, and won increasingly greater victories, capturing more than 90 percent of the groups the enemy sent to operate in the north, although they were very insidious and wily, were very well trained, and had many sophisticated, modern technical facilities.

In the fight against the war of destruction waged by the U.S. air force and navy, although they were armed only with infantry weapons, thanks to an heroic spirit and creative resourcefulness the border defense units independently shot down 195 airplanes of all kinds. Units which achieved many exemplary feats of arms included the Ron post in Quang Binh, Quang Binh Company 1, the Hien Luong post in Vinh Linh, the Cau Treo post in Ha Tinh, and the Cua Hoi post in Nghe An.

In the recent fighting against the Chinese aggressor troops and their lackeys along the northern and southwestern borders there were many models with regard to both the morale and ability of the border defense troops. After being forced to retaliate for the initial attacks by enemy forces twice as large over a large operational area, the border defense posts resolutely held their ground, attacked the enemy from behind, attacked the enemy headquarters, wrestled with them in the border area, slowed the advance of the enemy troops, annihilated and wore down their forces, contributed to creating the position and increasing the strength of people's war to defend the homeland and, along with our entire population and army, defeated the war of aggression of the Beijing reactionaries. The Xa Mat post in Tay Ninh, Long Khot in Long An, Xi Lo Lau in Lai Chau, Huu Nghi Quan in Lang Son, Battalion 1, Regiment 12, and other units, and such cadres and men as Le Dinh Chinh, Lau A Phu, Loc Vien Tai, Do Si Hoa, etc., were units, cadres, and men who achieved outstanding merit and were awarded the "Hero of the People's Armed Forces" title by the Party and State.

The imperialists and expansionists are by nature encroachers and aggressors. They commit aggression to annex and encroach to create a staging area for aggression. That was true of the U.S. imperialists in the past and the Chinese expansionists at present. In the struggle to expose the enemy's evil intentions, the border defense troops have manifested patience, sensitivity, resourcefulness, and creativity. The Hien Luong post in Vinh Linh, with resolute, sharp reasoning, exposed many groups of high-ranking U.S.-puppet officers who came to observe the border area, then held its ground throughout a war of destruction in which, on the average, each cadre and enlisted man had to endure hundreds of bombs and shells. General Secretary Le Duan praised the

Hien Luong post for being "An heroic post that is very worthy of an heroic people and an heroic army." Along the Vietnamese-Chinese border, even during the period in which the Vietnamese and Chinese people were living in peace and friendship the border defense troops witnessed and coped with many extremely despicable and vile acts of encroachment by the other side. Due to profound awareness of their responsibility in defending every inch of the homeland, promptly discovering the enemy's evil intentions, and fully understanding the lines and stands of the party, the men patiently and persistently struggled, side-by-side with the armed forces and the ethnic minority people, to defeat many of their plots and schemes. Today, the reactionaries in the Chinese ruling circles and the U.S. imperialists are uniting to wage a very insidious many-sided war of destruction. But they have run up against determined, effective resistance by our soldiers and people. Their attempts to carry out psychological warfare, sabotage the economy, carry out armed provocations, build infrastructures, spread ideological poison, encourage the masses to illegally cross the border or flee by sea, and send spies and reconnaissance personnel into our interior have been the wanted. We have continued to strengthen and build our political and economic infrastructures in the border areas. Our country's defensive strength has been steadily increased. The Border Defense Troops, along with the soldiers and people of the entire nation, are certain to have sufficient morale and energy to victoriously fulfill the two strategic missions delineated by the Fifth Party Congress.

They base their actions solidly on the people, fighting for the people, "regard the post as their house, the border as their home area, and the ethnic minority people as their brothers and sisters," manifest a sense of responsibility, unite closely with the sectors and forces, and achieve a common will between the soldiers and the people.

The Border Defense Troops, like the People's Armed Public Security Forces in the past, firmly base all activities on the people and make them the foundation on which to fulfill all missions.

The actual situation in Tay Bac, Viet Bac, Truong Son, the Central Highlands, and the coastal areas, on islands, etc., has shown that if the Border Defense Troops know how to rely on the people there are no difficulties they cannot overcome and no mission they cannot fulfill. But if they are to rely on the people they must positively and persistently proselytize and organize them and be concerned with cultivating the people's strength in all ways. In many places, just after they were liberated many ethnic minority groups and hamlets were hungry, cold, and backward, feudalism and colonialism were still prevalent, and they were continually subjected to distorted propaganda, inveigled, dominated, and prevented from coming into contact with the troops by reactionaries in the guise of religion or nationalism, or by local bandits or pirates, which hindered military-civilian solidarity and created difficulty for the fulfillment of the border defense mission. Despite the difficulties and obstacles, the border defense troops persistently won over the people, closely monitored each village, became familiar with each family, shared everything with the people, established bonds with the localities, integrated themselves with the people, and swore allegiance, in order to build a mass base. Fighting for the people and basing activities on the people were daily slogans in all activities of the border defense cadres and men.

In the course of their actual work over a period of many years, the Border Defense Troops have affirmed that it is necessary to build a people's defense line with strong "battlefield positions of people's hearts" which the enemy could not shatter. In all border areas of the homeland, when they first set foot in an area the border defense units sent outstanding cadres to the villages and hamlets to participate in building and consolidating the party organizations, governmental administrations, and mass organizations; help the localities implement the stands and policies of the Party and state, especially the religious and ethnic policies; actively propagandize, disseminate, and carry out the three revolutions; encourage fixed cultivation and habitation, introduce science and technology to the mountain region fields, assist the people with regard to new varieties, water conservancy techniques, electricity, machinery, and fertilizer; promote agricultural production; and improve the people's living conditions. The cultural-ideological revolution was gradually carried out among the ethnic minority people. The light of civilization shone increasingly on the villages and hamlets. The bad customs and superstitions were gradually limited and repulsed. In many places there were profound transformations in political, economic, cultural, and social life.

There were many beautiful images of groups and individual Border Defense cadres and men devoting themselves to the movement in order to help the people. For example, the heroic martyr Tran Van Tho for 3 consecutive years lived with the Ha Nhi ethnic group at the Leng Xu Xin border intersection in Lai Chau, along with his unit participated in setting up seven cooperatives, and campaigned for the people to come down from the mountains to adopt fixed cultivation and habitation and create a way of life completely different from that of the past. The border defense cadres and men helped transform the Phu Bi cooperative from a hamlet that suffered poverty, hunger, and disease the year round into an advanced mountain region cooperative.

The cadres and men of Post 117 in Quang Binh overcame all hardships and difficulties to go to each cave and grass hut of the people, proselytized the people of the Ma Nghi and Cu Khai groups and helped them form hamlets, produce grain, make clothing, learn to read, vote for the National Assembly, and set up militia units to defend the villages. The men of the Pu Nhi post in Thanh Hoa, not minding difficulty or fatigue, climbed hills and waded across streams along hundreds of kilometers of forest trails, carrying on their shoulders tens of tons of equipment and materials to build a hydroelectricity station so that the Hmong people could have electric lights day and night. The people called such light "revolutionary lights." There were models of selfless devotion to the people, of sharing food and clothing, treating the people's illnesses and assisting them in giving birth; of contributing their small allowances to buy plows and hoes for the people; and of going to places hundreds of kilometers away to bring back salt, seeds, etc., which will be fondly remembered forever. The people call such border defense troops "children of the village," "cadres of the Party," and "troops of Uncle Ho." A revolutionary nature, class love, loving the people as if they were one's blood relatives, and the troops' sense of political responsibility were the bases of the slogan, "The post is one's house, the border is one's home area, and the ethnic minority people are one's brothers and sisters." Because they were deeply imbued with the fraternal sentiment of that slogan, many border defense cadres and men volunteered to remain permanently in the border areas.

The border defense cadres and men are as close to the ethnic minority people in the border region as "fish to water" and the ethnic minority people of the border areas, for their part, are also very close to the border defense troops. The reason is that the troops and the people share the same ideals, the same revolutionary goal, and the same enemy. The soldiers and the people share the same will. Therefore, if there are a myriad of noble images of border defense troops working with the people, there are also a myriad of noble images of the people helping the border defense troops. The Nung and Dao women in Cao Bang formed ranks and struggled face-to-face with the encroaching Chinese troops at Thac Ban Doc. Many young water buffalo herders discovered bad people and ran dozens of kilometers to report to the border defense troops. The Ba Na and Mo Kong women in Dac Ninh and Dac Lac went into the jungles to appeal for their husbands and sons who were FULRO followers to return and report to the local authorities.

That rich reality affirms that our Party's viewpoint on defending the border by means of a people's defense line is correct. That is a concretization of the viewpoint that the revolution is a mass undertaking. It has truly become a strength and a precious tradition of the Border Defense Troops.

They have manifested a spirit of pure international solidarity, united closely with the people, the armed forces, and the border defense forces of the fraternal socialist countries, resolutely fulfilled their ethnic and international missions, and worked together to build and maintain a peaceful border and fight the common enemy on the border.

Fulfilling their missions on the border corridor and at the important entranceway positions of the homeland, such as airfields, railroad stations, and ports, and at sea, the border defense troops are in continuous contact with the governmental administrations, people, and armed forces of the neighboring countries, and with international guests. Against the current background, there are many border problems left behind by history and caused by the imperialists and reactionaries, who continually seek ways to incite sabotage. They are also created by other conditions in national relations. Thus the border defense work is very complicated. In those areas there are also problems in ethnic relations, clan relations, and international relations. The way a certain nation deals with its border defense in general and its borders specifically are determined by all of that nation's internal and external relations. Thus in the border defense work it is necessary to fully understand the lines and viewpoints of our Party and manifest a spirit of socialist patriotism, while also manifesting a spirit of proletarian internationalism, and have correct policies toward all matters at the border and in the border defense areas. Firmly grasping the lines and viewpoints of our Party, the laws of our state, and international law, the Border Defense Troops resolutely defend their national sovereignty, respect the national sovereignty of other countries, and always manifest an attitude of courtesy, civility, and friendship toward foreign guests visiting our country.

Our peoples respect for friends and guests are manifested in contact between the Border Defense Troops and many delegations of international visitors. Many delegations of international guests left and entered our country during the

years in which U.S. aircraft were dropping bombs in the north and sowing mines to blockade it. They had good impressions of our country and the Vietnamese people through their contact with the border defense troops at Dong Dang in Lang Son, at the Port of Hai Phong, at Cua Hoi in Nghe An, etc. On the friendship borders, our Border Defense Troops were always united with the people, armed forces, and border defense forces of the fraternal socialist countries, continually strengthened relations, exchanged opinions, studied and assisted one another, and helped one another build peaceful and increasingly rich, beautiful, and happy border areas.

With regard to Laos and Kampuchea, the international solidarity of our people and our border defense forces is extremely pure, has become increasingly durable, like the Truong Son mountain chain and the Mekong River, and has been bolstered by the parties and people of the three countries.

On the Vietnam-Laos border, a special friendship border, in the past, in order to meet our friends' requirements many border defense cadres and men, not minding hardship and sacrifice, along with the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese volunteer troops, fought to wipe out the bandits, eliminate the spies and commandoes, and build political and economic bases, and endured hardships for several long decades in very difficult places, and loved the people of Laos as if they were their own people. Tran Van Trung in Nghe An patiently worked with the local forces in persuading an enemy post garrisoned by 43 Lao soldiers to revolt and return to the people with 29 weapons. Comrade Dao Xuan Phuong of Post 235 in Vinh Linh helped lead nearly 100 Lao families from their caves and helped them build houses, create a hamlet, and organize their production and living conditions. Comrades Tong Chu and Hoang Chinh in Lai Chau fulfilled a special mission: protecting comrade Souphanouvong and the group of high-ranking Pathet Lao cadres who had escaped from prison and guiding them safely back to the base area. There were many other examples of heroism and unselfishness by other Vietnamese border defense troops in Laos. They further embellished Vietnamese-Laotian friendship, which is forever fresh and will endure forever.

On the Vietnam-Kampuchea border, the border defense units, along with the people in the border areas and the armed forces, had to cope with and retaliate against the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang while defending the Kampuchean people and saving them from misfortune. When the people of Kampuchea arose and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Government led by Chairman Heng Samrin was formed, the border defense troops the Vietnamese Volunteer Army fulfilled their international mission in order to assist our friends under the new conditions.

At present, along the two special Vietnam-Laos and Vietnam-Kampuchea friendship borders, the border defense forces of the three countries are cooperating closely and assisting one another with a sentiment of brotherhood, in order to have increased strength with which to oppose the war of destruction now being waged by the common enemy of the three countries, the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, in league with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionary power. On the basis of the independent, autonomous lives of each party and state, the border defense troops of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea always respect one another and strictly observe the principles of sovereignty and territorial

integrity and the contents of the agreements and conventions that have been signed, in order to fulfill their mission.

On the Vietnam-China border, we have always endeavored to create a border of friendship. Our party has always believed that the people who have committed aggression toward, encroached upon, and sabotaged the border, thus creating a border of enmity, have been the expansionists and hegemonists who are now ruling the Chinese people. They are the enemy of the Vietnamese people and are at the same time the enemy of the Chinese people. On the border we have persisted for decades in struggling to ensure respect for each other's sovereignty. We have also resolutely defended our national sovereignty and defended every inch of the sacred soil of the homeland. The Border Defense Troops have always worked with our people and armed forces to maintain constant vigilance, be prepared to fight, and resolutely smash all of their encroachment and aggression plots and acts. In the past, all of the enemy's despicable and vile schemes were exposed and aborted. Today, we are certain to completely defeat them, no matter how insidious and crafty their plots. In struggle and combat against the Chinese reactionaries we always manifest a spirit of internationalism and join the Chinese people in opposing the common enemy of both nations. No matter what the circumstances, the tradition of pure, loyal international solidarity of our soldiers and people and of our country's Border Defense Troops has been held high and has been manifested in the just and extremely correct revolutionary line and international line of our Party.

The Border Defense Troops have very close internal solidarity and the cadres and men love one another as if they were blood brothers and share good times and bad, endeavor to study and train, continually cultivate their revolutionary quality and virtue, and continually improve their combat skills, their professional ability, and their level of work performance.

Solidarity is strength. It is a political requirement and a weapon which ensures the victorious fulfillment of missions under the circumstances and conditions of independent, dispersed activities in distant, remote places with many difficulties, hardships and deprivations. The Border Defense cadres and men, sharing the same ideals and struggle goals, and standing together on the front lines on the borders, on islands, and at the strategic positions of the homeland, are bound together by love for their class, their comrades, and their fellow unit members. When things are going well and when there are difficulties, the Command of the Border Defense Troops and the cadres at the provincial, municipal, and regimental levels, are present beside the men and go all-out to instruct them while encouraging them to fulfill their missions. When climbing hills, fording streams, and traversing the jungle in pursuit of the enemy, and sleeping in the jungle at night, the cadres and men share everything. Although they were old, some company cadres were still prepared to endure the winter cold, and carried the men in their unit across muddy fields, one by one, so that their shoes would not get wet and to ensure that they could continue to closely pursue the enemy troops. The comrades in the Command often crossed high peaks to go to outposts and discuss with the troops plans for attacking the enemy in the high altitudes at Neo Vac (Ha Giang) and Sinh Ho (Lai Chau), or on Cu Lao Thu (Thuan Hai), Hon Tre (Kien Giang), etc. A letter

from home could cause happiness or sadness in the entire unit. All of those things reflected the comradeship and brotherly love of the border defense soldiers and men. That profound sentiment was built on the basis of reason and unity of will and action. Solidarity was based on broad democratic, strict, voluntary discipline and continually carrying out criticism and self-criticism, distinguishing right from wrong, having complete affection, and sharing hardships and victories. The cadres loved and cared for the material and spiritual lives of the men, who loved and respected the cadres, carried out the orders of the commander, and created combined strength in order to achieve good results in work and combat. All cadres and men of the border defense troops endeavor to study, train, struggle, improve their revolutionary quality and virtue, and continually improve their combat and work ability in order to do an increasingly better job of meeting the requirements of their missions. The upper echelon pays attention to organizing short-term and long-term political, military, professional, and cultural courses in order to raise the men's level in all regards. The cadres and men at the lower echelon voluntarily and diligently research and study, and study while they work. In the course of actual combat they gain experience so that they can advance; they study the instructors, their comrades, the people, and life. Therefore, in 25 years of fighting and maturing the Border Defense cadres and men have continually grown. In the fierce testing of combat and the complicated struggle they have proved to be steadfast and resolute, their combat skills have steadily increased, their professional knowledge has become increasingly expert and sharp, and their knowledge of all aspects has continually been built up. The cadres and men have studied positively so that they could grasp modern knowledge regarding the border defense work, gone all-out in research and study so that they could expertly use the modern weapons and technical facilities, and increased the effectiveness of their combat and work, in accordance with the new requirements. They always maintain their noble revolutionary qualities, live with pure, wholesome ideals, are optimistic, do not give in to the bribery and seduction of the bad elements, do not retreat before the enemy, live modest, simple lives, unite closely with the people and the other armed forces, always respect the old and love the young, unite with youths, respect women, etc., and have the love and trust of the people. Most of the cadres and men have played exemplary, leading roles in work and outstandingly fulfilled the missions assigned them, and many comrades have become cadres and party members, including a number of ethnic minority group members. Some comrades have been named heroes. The all-out contributions of each cadre and enlisted man is the source of the common strength of the basic-level party organizations of the border defense posts, stations, and mobile units, and also creates the common strength of the Border Defense Troops as a whole, so that they can contribute to further embellishing the traditions of the heroic Vietnam people's armed forces.

In order to play their role and fulfill their forces in the new situation, the Border Defense Troops must always grasp their basic, principal, and permanent mission: managing and protecting national sovereignty and maintaining security along the borders, at sea, and on the islands of the homeland. They must clearly realize the security, national defense, and external nature, as well as the continuous, permanent, fierce, and complicated nature of that mission. In peacetime, that mission must be carried out 24 hours a day in all border areas and along all segments of the border. When war breaks out and in war to defend

the homeland, that mission must also continue to be carried out with appropriate forces, organizations, and methods. The fulfillment of that basic mission requires the Border Defense Troops to firmly grasp the situation and missions of the revolution and the locality, and the political, economic, and military lines of the Party, as well as its internal and external stands and policies and those regarding the suppression of counterrevolution. They must grasp the enemy's situation and our situation in the border areas, cleverly apply the border defense professional and technical measures, create and maintain close coordination and cooperation with the main-force units, the local troops, and the militia, self-defense, and public security units in all border areas, and do a good job of resolving the relationship between security and national defense in the border defense work.

The border defense mission requires the Border Defense Troops to be thoroughly familiar with their area of operations, fully understand the adversaries; research, investigate, and explore the possible dangers; build an infrastructure network; carry out struggle; encourage the masses to carry out the political, educational, and reform work; and promptly uncover and eliminate the enemy elements engaged in underground activity. They must study the laws of ambushing and annihilating the commandos and spies who infiltrate our interior, and tightly manage the borders on land, at sea, and in the air so that no bad people and reactionaries can flee by sea or cross the border in order to flee abroad, and so that the enemy cannot infiltrate from the outside.

The border defense mission also requires the Border Defense Troops to take the initiative in making great contributions to building up border defenses. Those defenses are firmly based on the ethnic minority people in the border areas and the people in coastal areas and on islands, in order to ensure a solid political-morale basis for the border defense forces and activities. That battlefield deployment has both an open part, with forces operating openly, and a submerged part, with forces operating secretly. It brings into play the key-specialized role of the Border Defense Troops, combines the strength of the different forces stationed in the border defense areas, and creates a border defense network with both width and depth, along with the implementation and close combination of the professional border defense measures in a single, mutually supporting unit. On that basis they can master the homeland's borders on the land and at sea, and ensure the permanence, continuousness, and effectiveness of the border defense activities in peacetime and in war to defend the homeland.

It is essential that the great task of organizing the defense of our borders be tied in with the mission of building up the border areas in all regards. That is also true with regard to the key northern border. That is a common task of the entire nation, with the participation of all sectors and echelons at the central and local levels. Therefore, centralization and unification to develop the effectiveness of all sectors and forces in building and defending the borders are urgent requirements. Furthermore, each sector and force in the border areas must manifest a strong spirit of socialist cooperation and take the initiative in coordinating with and assisting one another, especially as regards the key-specialized forces in the border defense work.

Recently the General Staff issued a directive intended to concretize many important matters regarding the mission, organization, and utilization principles of the Border Defense Troops, so that they can be appropriate to the functions of the specialized forces in the border defense work and the actual situation in the border areas. We must do a good job of carrying out that directive, further develop the specialized forte of the Border Defense Troops, and further strengthen the combined strength of the army units, sectors, and forces operating in the border areas in order to solidly defense the frontiers of the homeland on land, at sea, and in the air under all circumstances.

For their part, the border defense posts and units must take the initiative in coordinating with the main-force units and the local mobile units which are sent to deploy defensively and prepare to fight, as well as with the other sectors and organs operating in the border areas and at sea, so that they can work together to carry out a division of labor and organize border management and defense in accordance with the decisions of the upper echelon, and strictly carry out the lines, policies, laws, and regulations of the Party and state on all borders, in coastal areas, and on islands. All mobile units of the Border Defense Troops must be deployed rationally in each area, with meticulous preparations with regard to ideology, organization, and operational plans, so that they can rapidly assist the various areas, posts, and key points, and especially to reinforce the professional forces in order to employ the professional measures as effectively as possible in the border defense areas.

The development of the role and function of the Border Defense Troops demands that we continue to build and perfect the guidance and command system, and correctly carry out he stands, policies, and professional regulations and principls, and legal procedures in the border defense work. The border defense work in placed under the unified leadership of the provincial and municipal party committees. Under the professional guidance of the Command of the Border Defense Troops and the unified command of the military region commands and the provincial military comands, the Border Defense Troops are assigned, deployed, and used in correct accordance with their functions and missions in order to do a good job of carrying out the border defense work, in accordance with the requirement of struggling against the many-sided war of destruction now being waged by the Beijing expansionists, combined with the common defensive deployment that is prepared to oppose a large-scale war of aggression waged by the enemy and bringing into play the roles of all forces participating in the border defense work.

By means of the actualities of bringing into play their role and function in order to fulfill the border defense mission in the new situation of the nation and the revolution, the Border Defense troops will continue to add to the strength and tradition that have been built up over the past 25 years.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROLE OF MARINES IN WARFARE REVIEWED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 84 pp 25-33

[Article by Lt Col Nguyen Dang Ha: "The Marines and Amphibious Landing Operations"]

[Text] The marines were formed above all to meet the needs of amphibious landing operations, which are a special kind of operation unlike all other types of combat, especially the phase of combat while landing troops on the beach.

Combat by the landing forces in the phase of landing troops on the beach is combat in the course of attacking from the sea to the coasts, islands, and archipelagoes of an enemy who is on the defensive. In order to attain its objectives, the side landing the troops ordinarily must use the combined forces of many combat arms and armed forces branches which are appropriately organized, equipped, and trained for the mission and characteristics of amphibious operations. In the first waves it is necessary to use assault forces with specialized equipment and facilities which have received special training and are capable of landing very rapidly with overwhelming strength, taking the enemy's forward strongpoints, supporting the succeeding troop landing waves, and then combining forces to take the landing zone and create a staging area for the main forces of the amphibious troops when they come ashore. Those assault units are part of a special force: the marines. The essential difference with regard to combat function between the marines and the other combat arms of the ground forces lies in their assault role. For that reason, the marines are called the infantry of the navy and their principal combat operational form is amphibious landings. The marines can be used in independent landings or to supplement the ground forces units being landed from the sea by fulfilling missions related to the combat operations of the landing forces. The marines can also be used to land to carry out reconnaissance or sabotage, or to occupy islands and archipelagoes.

The imperialist countries have assigned their marines the role of serving as the spearheads in the wars of aggression and in armed intervention. Since they were formed in 1775 the U.S. Marines have participated in more than 300 expeditions in foreign countries. At present the U.S. Marines are the largest such force in the world (according to a U.S. report they are 20 times larger in number than the marines of the Soviet Union). The United States classifies its marines as part of its strategic mobile forces. They are assigned the missions

of carrying out strategic attacks, landing commandos, serving as "fire brigades," etc., all over the world. The marines are the only combat arm in the U.S. armed forces the Constitution allows the U.S. president to send to carry out missions without the approval of Congress.

To wage aggression, the United States has organized "marine amphibious forces." The core of each "marine amphibious force" (MAF) is a marine division, plus marine aviation squadrons and support units. It totals 40,000 to 50,000 men carried aboard landing craft, with about 300 helicopters and 175 fixed-wing tactical aircraft. When carrying out landings, those forces are also supported by airplanes based on aircraft carriers. To cope with low-level armed conflicts, the United States has organized "marine amphibious brigades" (MAB) and "marine amphibious units" (MAU). The "marine amphibious brigades" consist of a marine regiment, three or four helicopter squadrons, and a number of support units, totalling 8,000 to 12,000 men. The "marine amphibious units" consist of a marine battalion, an aviation squadron, and a number of rear-services support units. A "marine amphibious unit" has 1,800 to 4,000 members. In its war of aggression in Vietnam the United States continually kept off the coast of South Vietnam one or two marine amphibious units, which had the mission of being prepared to penetrate our liberated area from the coast. Between 1965 and 1971 those U.S. units landed 72 times, with the objective of grabbing land in our liberated area or supporting their other activities on the mainland.

In the Soviet Union, marines are component parts of all fleets. The western press has had to admit that a very basic difference between Soviet marines and the U.S. marines is that "The marines of the Soviet Union have never acted as an intervention force" and "do not have a strategic offensive mission, as do the U.S. marines" (the U.S. journal MARINE, July 1980).

When one studies the activities of the Soviet marines in the Civil War, and especially in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) one sees that the amphibious landing operations of the Soviet Union in those wars had as their primary objective supporting the operations of ground forces in coastal areas. Even before the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union stressed the study of the wide use of amphibious landings, and regarded them as a basic form of combined operations of the navy and the ground forces units, on both the offensive and the defensive. "Amphibious operations were regarded as the most complicated combined operations of the army and navy" (the Soviet journal MILITARY HISTORY, No 8, 1977).

The amphibious activities of the Soviet Army began during the first phase of the Great Patriotic War, the phase of the strategic offensive. That was a feature which differed from the amphibious activities of the English, the United States, Germany, and Japan during World War II, for those nations carried out amphibious landings only when they were on the strategic offensive.

When the Soviet Union took the strategic initiative amphibious activities continued to play the role of one of the navy's key missions. During that period amphibious activities were intended to ensure that the ground forces could pass by straits and bays, and to create staging areas for the ground forces or surround and stop fleeing enemy troops. The amphibious activities of

the Black Sea Fleet speeded up the liberation of the southern part of the Soviet Union, as well as Bulgaria and Rumania. The landings by the Baltic Fleet liberated the Karelian Isthmus and the Monondun Archipelago, in order to annihilate the enemy troops in the area between lakes Ladoga and Onega. The amphibious activities of the Northern Fleet played an important role in liberating the Pechenga area and northern Finland. The Pacific Fleet, the Northern Pacific Flotilla, and the Amur River Squadron carried out many landings in August 1945, when the Soviet Union was attacking Japan's Kuantung Army. Those activities played an important role in rapidly taking Sakhalin Island, the Kurin Archepelago, and the ports in Korea, and in cutting off communications between the Kuantung Army and Japan and creating conditions for the Soviet Army to advance rapidly into the interior of Manchuria and rapidly surround and annihilate the strongest, most elite army of the Emperor of Japan.

In Vietnam, the marines of the people's armed forces were formed during the first days of the anti-U.S. war, but amphibious activities actually did not take place until the final phase of the war, when the requirements of liberating land and the islands and archipelagos became urgent, and when our navy in general and our marines in particular had matured to the point that they were capable of fulfilling those requirements. In the General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975 the marines, along with the other forces, liberated many islands and archipelagos in the southeastern and southwestern seas of the homeland. The marines fulfilled their mission of taking a number of islands and served as the vanguard in liberating a number of other islands. Those activities occurred under the conditions of resistance, including a number of battles in which the enemy fought back fiercely. To carry out a number of the landings it was necessary to spend many days at sea, and bad weather was encountered. In the General Offensive and Uprising of the spring of 1975 there also appeared the capability to carry out amphibious landings in coordination with the ground forces columns advancing down the coast.

The amphibious activities of the marines in the war to defend the homeland along our country's southwestern border underwent new developments, with regard to both scale and quality. In addition to landings carried out to take islands there were landings which were carried out in coordination with the activities of ground forces in coastal areas. In the course of that war our marines further matured.

Those events proved that building up the marine forces was very essential in the national liberation war and people's war to defend the homeland.

The marines of modern armed forces have developed along the lines of mechanization, the extensive use of helicopters to land troops, the use of light and guided weapons, etc. The composition of a modern marine regiment or division includes not only many infantry regiments but also tank, armored, anti-aircraft artillery, self propelled field artillery, and guided missile battalions, such combat support units as reconnaissance, military engineer, communications, chemical, and other units, and rear service and technical units. In addition to the various kinds of landing craft which have existed since World War II, such as infantry landing craft, tank landing craft, medium-sized landing craft, etc., there have appeared such new landing craft as landing command ships, ships carrying helicopters to land troops, landing craft

that also serve as docks, landing craft that also serve as repair craft, etc. Many nations have researched and produced hovercraft and hydrofoils for use in troop-landing, mine sweeping, anti-submarine, and patrol missions. All of those factors have increased the troop-landing rate and offensive power of the marines. The marines and the airborne forces can land not only by the shore-to-shore and the ship-to-shore methods, but also by making vertical landings by helicopters taking off from attack carriers. It may be said that because of the new technical equipment and the requirements of modern war, and their operational capabilities, today the role of the marines in amphibious landing operations specifically and modern operations in general has not only not declined but has increased in comparison to the previous periods.

In amphibious landing operations the marines may be used to carry out different combat missions, such as independent tactical landings, landings coordinated with ground forces units, landings on islands, landings at ports, reconnaissance landings, sabotage landings, etc., on different force scales. The victorious fulfillment of such missions by the marines is usually dependent on a number of key conditions:

1. All-round, secret preparations.

That is a very basic principle which all military activities must obey. At the same time, it reflects the special characteristics of amphibious landing operations. That principle has an especially important significance with regard to marines.

First of all, it is necessary to determine the objectives and missions to be assigned and the area, zone, segment, and point of the landing and decide on the formations, order, times, and combat methods for approaching the shore, landing troops ashore, and taking a bridgehead and developing the attack. Then it is necessary to make preparations with regard to organization, TOE, equipment, and training of the landing forces, the assembly area, the various aspects of combat coordination and combat support, the organization of command and communications, etc., for the whole operation and throughout the process of fighting to attain the objectives and missions that have been set forth. The preparations of the marine units must be carried out as part of a unified whole, in accordance with a unified plan for the over-all preparatory work for the amphibious landing under the command and direction of the highest-ranking marine or naval commander.

The full understanding of the combat missions of the marine units in a battle or campaign is very important. Whether it is a mission of carrying out an independent landing or one of carrying out a landing in coordination with the ground forces units, the position, role, objectives, sphere of operations, initial mission, follow-up mission, combat organization, and combat formation of each marine unit differ. Those differences directly govern all aspects of the work of preparing for each battle.

In the preparatory process, it is necessary to collect intelligence information from all sources regarding the landing zone, the landing segment, and even the landing points where the marines will land troops. It is necessary to have clear understanding of the enemy's firepower and obstacles, the depth of the

sea, the tide regime, the terrain and geology of the ocean floor, the climate and weather, the nightfall and daybreak times, etc., in that area. The collection of information on those matters must be carried out carefully and meticulously from the time when the amphibious landing is first proposed to the time of the opening salvoes, and throughout the combat by the units with the mission of landing on the enemy's shore.

On the basis of fully understanding the missions and accurately analyzing the information that has been gathered, it is necessary to draft plans for the overall amphibious landing as well as for the phase of fighting to land troops ashore. That is a major content of the preparatory process. In the operational plans, it is necessary to determine the landing zone and landing points, the make-up of the troops, the operational methods, and the objectives that must be attained in each phase of the landing. It is necessary to have contingency plans to deal with circumstances that arise in the process of fighting to land the troops, especially when difficulties are encountered and the landing cannot be carried out in accordance with the original plan.

All preparatory activities must be carried out in extreme secrecy in order to ensure the surprise of the landing. The work of the staff, rear-services, and technical organs, the troop movement and bivouac activities, and the communications activities, etc., must observe the anti-espionage, secrecy, camouflage, and feint regulations, and effectively oppose the intelligence activities and observation and reconnaissance schemes of the enemy in the air, at sea, and on land, by means of both visual observation and electronic equipment.

2. Commanding and carrying out the attack resolutely and flexibly.

In reality, an amphibious operation is an offensive operation. Therefore, the foremost and basic requirement of the operational command and activities of the marines in amphibious landing combat is to be very resolute and flexible, achieve surprise, and land troops at a rapid rate.

The basic objective of combat in troop landings is to annihilate the enemy and take and hold the predetermined objectives. If that is to be accomplished, it is necessary to seek all ways to smash the enemy's will to fight and put up an organized resistance in all three environments (in the air, at sea, and on land), especially in the key areas, in order to master the battlefield, rapidly develop the attack into the enemy's in-depth defense, and fulfill the mission of the landing. Resoluteness in the operational command and activity of the marines when carrying out amphibious landings is manifested above all in always grasping the combat mission and the area and objectives that must be taken, by all means, in order to advance to and take the predetermined missions.

The objective that must be taken by marines in an amphibious landing may be a bridgehead on the shore, a landing zone, and island, an archipelago, a port, a city or town, an important communications hub, dominating high ground, etc., on a coast occupied by the enemy. The process of taking such objectives is usually very fierce. The side opposing the landing uses all possible capabilities and methods to throw its air force, anti-aircraft forces, navy, artillery, missiles, tanks, and infantry into the fighting to stop the landing.

forces at a distance, while they are still at sea, especially in the area in which the landing forces are deploying their landing formation and carrying out the landing. The side carrying out the landing must seek all ways to bring into play the effect of its armed forces branches in suppressing the air and firepower of the side opposing the landing, achieve mastery at sea and in the air, open paths through the underwater obstacles and on the enemy shore, rapidly land troops to take the bridgehead, and develop the attack deep into the enemy's battlefield positions.

The combat activities of the first marine units to be landed have a decisive effect on the success or failure of the landing. Therefore, the actions of such units must be extremely determined and flexible; they must quickly take advantage of favorable opportunities, although very rare and very brief, to approach the shore and take the landing point, the landing area, the landing zone, or the predetermined objectives. The landing plans cannot always be carried out smoothly. Therefore, once the landing formation has been deployed, no matter what eventuality may arise, even if paths have not yet been cleared through the obstacles those units must strongly advance with the greatest possible speed in the direction of the predetermined objectives, adjust and move forces, carry out the landing and attack continuously. Any hesitation on the part of the marines will result in greater losses, and may even threaten the landing with defeat. Of course, in the process of carrying out the attack there may be times when it is necessary to halt temporarily to reform ranks or fight enemy counterattacks, but immediately afterwards it is necessary to continue the attack to take the predetermined objectives.

In the process of battle, the commanders of marine units must know how to take full advantage of the firepower of the air force, the navy, and the various kinds of accompanying artillery (including tanks) of the units. The landing commanders must rapidly approach the shore, fully utilize the shock force of the tanks and mechanized units in the table of organization and reinforce them in order to rapidly take the landing points. The commanders must keep informed of and coordinate the rate of advance of the landing waves, be sensitive to all developments in order to make truly timely, incisive decisions, bring into play the strength of all troop components under their command, continually maintain coordination, communications, and command, do a good job of organizing anti-aircraft defense, anti-tank defense, anti-chemical warfare defense, etc., throughout the process of landing troops ashore and attacking to take the predetermined targets. When running up against problems, caused by enemy activities, the terrain, bad weather, or limited reconnaissance capability, which causes the landing troops to go astray from the designated point or beach, causes disorder, and slows down the attack, or causes the loss of a good opportunity, it is even more important that the commanders of marine units be extremely calm in order to assess the situation, urgently grasp and reorganize the units, and restore the formation in order to attack.

3. Coordinate closely and continuously in combat.

First of all, there must be close coordination among the marine components: coordination between the assault landing detachments and the other landing detachments, the groups destroying obstacles, and the fire support detachments, between the accompanying artillery and tanks, etc. There must also be close

coordination between the marine units and the units of the other combat arms and armed forces branches participating in the landing, and especially with the units supporting the landing and the attack. It is necessary to organize coordination in counterattacking the enemy, conserve our forces in the phases of concentrating and boarding landing craft, movements at sea, fighting to land troops ashore, and fighting ashore, in order to fulfill the missions assigned in amphibious landings.

When organizing coordination with the units of such combat arms as the air force, artillery, missiles, and tanks it is necessary to determine the locations, zones, opportunities, the time for opening fire, and enemy casualty rate that must be attained, the target-finding and fire control methods, the method and order of the landing, the fighting methods to be used by the landing detachments to take objectives ashore, etc. It is necessary to determine the quantities, methods, and landing order of the tank and amphibious tank units, the routes along which the detachments will pass, and the method of supporting the groups clearing obstacles, as well as the operational method for supporting the marine units carrying out the landing, rapidly advancing, annihilating the enemy's coastal defenses, and fighting counterattacking enemy troops in the process of fighting ashore, etc.

When organizing coordination with such specialized units as military engineering, chemical, technical, and rear services units, it is necessary to determine the locations and numbers of paths that must be opened through the obstacles, the time when they are to be opened, the method of support by the various forces for the combat engineers opening the routes, the method of operation of the mobility support units in restoring roads and bridges and quickly building temporary roads in the course of the attack. It is necessary to determine the areas, situations, and times in which the side opposing the landing can use chemical weapons in the course of fighting who are landing and advancing in the predetermined directions, the defensive methods of the marine detachments and the activities of the chemical detachments, etc. It is necessary to determine the quantity and types of technical military equipment that must be repaired, and the quantities of POL and ammunition that must be supplied, and estimate the number of casualties needing treatment, the quantities of food and medicine that must be supplied, and the activities of the rear services and technical detachments in the various phases of the landing.

The determination of matters regarding coordination between the marine units and the naval, air force, and ground forces units, and the airborne troops and anti-aircraft troops, as well as the other relevant units in amphibious operations is usually achieved by the direct exchange of opinions between the marine commanders and the commanders of the units with which they are to coordinate. By that means agreement is reached on the optimal operational methods, so that they can work together in fulfilling the specific missions of each unit and attaining the common objectives of the landing. Under the conditions of people's war in our country, the marines must also coordinate with the militia and self-defense forces at sea and on the coast, and with the sapper forces participating in the course of fulfilling their missions.

In order to maintain close, continuous coordination it is necessary to reach agreement about the signs and signals used to identify one another, the selection of targets, requests to act or cease actions, questions and answers, etc. Those signs and signals must be simple, easy to use, easy to remember, and difficult to mix up. It is necessary to maintain communications between the marine units and the units with which they are coordinating, promptly uncover deficiencies, and quickly restore coordination when it is interrupted in the stages of fighting during the landing.

4. Improve the quality of combat training of the marines.

Only if the marines are carefully trained can they fulfill their assault role in amphibious landing combat. There are usually two processes in training marines: training in accordance with annual programs and plans and training for specific missions and plans. Those two processes supplement each other, but the first is basic, the foundation. Both processes always closely combine all aspects of developing the marine units: organization, manpower, equipment, political-morale-psychological tempering, and technical and rear services support.

In order to meet the requirements of their combat missions the marines' organization and equipment must be efficient and light, so that they can move rapidly in both environments: on the water and on the land (and sometimes in the air) and be suitable for attacks from the sea to the shore, with an attack depth that is usually not very great. In the event that it is necessary to use marines in attack in-depth on land, their role may be different from that when they were fulfilling the mission of carrying out amphibious landings. In some countries marines are not drafted directly from the public manpower pool but are selected from the other combat arms and armed forces branches. That is because they want to select people with good quality and high esprit who have actual experience in the army. A number of other countries accept volunteers into the marines. Thus beginning with the manpower recruitment phase the marines have a basis on which to ensure their "quality" with regard to politics-morale, physical condition, and skill.

The marines must be trained meticulously and comprehensively under conditions that are as close as possible to the complicated situations that could arise during amphibious landings. By means of training the ability of the marines to act must reach a sufficiently high level for them to be used in all tactical modes. Therefore, actual practice accounts for a very large percentage of the training time. Training marines to become expert with regard to tactical landing formations and study by the command organs so that they can firmly grasp the method of using marines in tactical landings are very necessary, especially with regard to the landing formations of marine battalions. The marine battalion landing formation is ordinarily widely used in landings for which the navy is responsible (tactical landings of one or many battalions) and is also very appropriate for the use of marines in large-scale amphibious operations organized and carried out by the army. In such operations the marines usually make up the battalions leading the way in the first wave and open the way for the units landing later. The landing of marine companies by helicopter is also a widespread formation in amphibious landing operations.

because it is appropriate to a small scale, a medium scale, or a large scale. Therefore, attention is usually paid to training marines to be expert in landing by helicopter landings in such formations.

The marine units must be made up of people who are well-developed physically and are capable of fighting at sea and ashore under complicated conditions and circumstances. They must be trained to become people who are skilled and expert in the use of their weapons and technical equipment on all kinds of terrain (sandy beaches, marshes, lowlands, high-altitude areas, thick jungles, etc.), and under all weather and visibility conditions (strong waves and winds, dark nights, fog, rain, etc.).

The marines, whether infantrymen, tankers, field artillerymen, anti-aircraft gunners, military engineers, or communications personnel must be trained so that they can become sailors who are very familiar with capabilities of ships and the way of life aboard ships. When necessary, they can participate in operating the ship, coping with accidents (putting out fires, preventing the ship from sinking), using weapons to fight the enemy at sea, etc. They must be capable of enduring waves and wind, be able to land by ship, by helicopter, or by parachuting, and maintain their fighting ability after long periods of sea, with big waves and strong wind.

Although they have been well-trained in accordance with a basic program, but once they have been assigned specific combat missions the marine units must carry out supplementary training. That supplementary training is intended to raise the unit's level with regard to tactics, gunnery, travel at sea, coordination, landing, etc., and enable officers in the same staff organ to become familiar with the specific conditions of the coming amphibious operations. When landing on islands the units must also pay attention to training to overcome water obstacles by using specialized ships in waters with rock cliffs and rock shoals, or by amphibious tanks and armored vehicles and by existing facilities and on-the-spot facilities. They must be trained in independent combat activities on the islands by using small units, in rough terrain and thick jungles, especially when the enemy can use chemical weapons.

We must pay attention to studying and creatively using experiences regarding the development, training, and combat of the navies of modern armed forces under our conditions, while at the same time being concerned with recapitulating the experiences of our army and navy in general and of the marines specifically, in order to strongly develop our marines so that they can contribute worthily to the enterprise of defending and building the homeland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COMBAT COORDINATION BY TANKS DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 84 pp 34-41

[Article by Lt Col Le Van Lam: "Combat Coordination Between Tanks and the Other Combat Arms and Armed Forces Branches on the Offensive"]

[Text] Close combat coordination between tanks and the units of the other combat arms and armed forces branches has become a principle-like requirement in modern war, in order to win victory on the battlefield, especially while on the offensive. The surprise and mobility capabilities of tanks and armored vehicles in attacks depend directly on the results of that coordination. After studying the experience gained in the recent national liberation and national defense wars, and the combat training and combat readiness experiences of the armored combat arm in recent years, I would like to express some opinions regarding the matter of combat coordination between tanks and armored vehicles and the other combat arms and armed forces branches while on the offensive.

1. The principle-like characteristics and principles of combat coordination between the tank troops and the combat arms and armed forces branches while on the offensive.

In the offensive campaigns and battles during the anti-U.S. resistance war and the war to defend the homeland along our country's southwest border, the tank troops essentially only coordinated with the infantry, military engineers, and artillery, and to a certain degree with the air force and navy. In war to defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland against the Chinese expansionsits and hegemonists and the aggressor imperialist powers, the tanks troops will have to coordinate their combat with nearly all the combat arms and armed forces branches, and with the local armed forces. Thus the contents, methods, and objectives of coordination between the tank troops and the other combat arms and armed forces branches will be more, richer, and more complicated than in the past wars. In the past, the tank units often fought battle by battle: as soon as one battle had concluded they returned to their combat positions and prepared for another battle. But in large-scale war to defend the homeland the tank troops will have to fight continuously to fulfill their immediate missions and those to follow, and will have to develop the fighting over a large area and with great depth. Therefore, combat coordination between the tank and armored troops and the other forces clearly will have to be organized over a large area, and it will be necessary to maintain coordination that is solid, continuous, and continually supplemented in the process of fighting under the circumstances of fierce, complicated campaigns and battles.

In order to, along with the infantry, bring into play the main assault force of the army in offensive campaigns and battles, the tank and armored troops must fully develop their assault force and mobility and attain a high rate of attack day and night, beginning with the time when the attack begins to the development of the attack deep into the enemy defenses. The tank and armored troops are usually used in a concentrated manner to launch a frontal attack, combined with deep-penetration attacks and boomerang attacks, and in coordination with the main attack and the other widely separated attacks.

In modern offensive campaigns the tank and armored troops often must move from one area to another in order to carry out a new order of the combined combat arms commander to create a new situation, concentrate efforts in the main direction of the attack, change the direction of the attack, or cope with unforeseen situations. There may also be instances in which the tank and armored troops engage in coordinated combat with the local armed forces in a certain area.

Those combat activities of the tank troops can take place in many kinds of terrain in our country: the jungles and mountains region, the lowlands, the coastal area, and the cities and municipalities.

Furthermore the tanks, in our troops' attacking spearheads, are the targets of all kinds of modern anti-tank facilities of the enemy ground forces and air force. The enemy can counterattack our attacking tank units by using missiles, their air force, and artillery while our tanks are still in their assembly areas, when they are on the move, and when they are deploying, from the tactical assault phase to the phase of fulfilling the battle and campaign missions.

The highest requirement of combat coordination among the combat arms and armed forces branches in the offensive, the forces and units participating in the campaigns and battles, is that they must act harmoniously and in unison, and coordinate with one another closely and continuously to create the greatest offensive strength with which to fulfill the common missions of the battle and campaign. In order to fulfill those common requirements, each unit and force must develop to a high degree the strength of the table of organization and the technical and tactical capabilities of all weapons and technical equipment at hand, in order to fulfill the combat or combat support missions assigned them. At the same time, they must positively take the initiative in coordinating with the other forces and units, create conditions for them to fulfill their missions, and strictly carry out the coordination plans, especially in difficult, fierce situations. That is the best method of coordination to develop the role and function of each force and unit, and to create the combined strength coordinated combat by combat arms and armed forces branches.

In modern offensive campaigns and battles on land, the tank troops and the infantry (mechanized infantry) are the main forces which directly determine victory on the battlefield, wipe out enemy manpower, destroy enemy technical facilities, capture POW's and weapons, and take and hold the assigned objectives. Therefore, the forces and units of the other combat arms and armed forces branches must, depending on their missions, fully bring into play their offensive strength, positively and actively give assistance, and ensure that

those principal forces fulfill their missions in accordance with the orders of the commander and the coordination plans of the combat arms and armed forces branches and of the offensive campaign or battle.

In battles as well as in campaigns, the orders of the commanders of combined combat arms units are always the basis of coordination. The commanders of the combined combat arms units have the highest authority in determining, managing, and commanding the fulfillment of coordinated plans. The staff organ is the managing organ which organizes coordination among the forces of the combat arms and armed forces branches, in order to fully understand the over-all missions and the missions of each force and to resolve specific problems regarding coordination and organize the inspection and supervision of the fulfillment of coordination plans. The process of combat under modern conditions is also a process in which the commanders of combined combat arms and the staff organs must monitor and inspect the carrying out of coordination and promptly adjust, supplement, or reorganize if coordination is loose or insufficient, or has been destroyed, in order to ensure that coordination is carried out continuously and solidly.

On the scale of a campaign, after the campaign commander decides on the plan and mode of attack, the commander of tanks and armored vehicles must concretize the matters regarding coordination, recommended in a conference to discuss coordination chaired by the campaign chief of staff. By means of such conferences it is necessary to reach agreement about the missions, objectives, times, locations, and offensive schemes of the tank and armored units and the other forces, the methods for ensuring the tanks' mobility, plans for fire support by the artillery and the air force, and plans for anti-aircraft support for the tank forces in the course of the campaign.

In the campaign, coordination between the tank troops and the other combat arms and armed forces is essentially coordination according to missions, time, or area. It is possible to organize coordination by using maps and sand tables. In the main areas or in the decisive phase coordination may be organized on the scene. In actual practice, the organization of coordination in campaigns in the preparatory phase can be carried out specifically and concretely only in the first phase of the campaign. With regard to the organization of coordination in the following phases, ordinarily it is only possible to set guidelines and the major requirements. If those guidelines and plans are to become reality, in coordinating the command cadres must discuss things carefully and in detail. The commanders of tank and armored units and the units of the other combat arms and armed forces branches must be people who propose very rational plans for using their forces, while at the same time setting requirements regarding close coordination, reinforcement, and support for his forces.

On the scale of a battle, coordinated actions between the tank troops and the units of the other combat arms and armed forces branches normally requires more specific, detailed organization on the scene. In coordination plans it is necessary to clearly indicate the missions, requirements, and actions of the tanks and the other forces in the various phases of the battle, and the basic situations that may arise. The coordination plans must be specific with regard to the smallest detail, such as signs and signals for mutual recognition,

prior to a campaign or battle, if an infantry unit being reinforced by tank and armored troops does not know very much about tanks the tank troops can instruct the infantry about the tank capabilities, techniques, and tactics, and the points requiring attention in the process of coordinated combat.

Combat coordination between tank troops and artillery. Artillery firepower plays a key role in the preparatory firepower phase, as well as when supporting the tanks and infantry in the course of offensive combat. The campaign artillery and the organic division artillery, in combination with the various kinds of anti-tank weapons of the infantry and the artillery firepower of the tanks themselves have the missions of neutralizing and annihilating the enemy anti-tank facilities and tanks, and pouring intense firepower on the objectives to be attacked and taken by the tanks, especially in the key areas of the attack. The tank units must coordinate closely and act in harmony with the anti-tank artillery units and the mobile obstacle emplacement units. In carrying out attacks while on the move, and especially when fighting separately, the tank units may be reinforced with artillery units to provide them direct fire support so that they can attack and fight enemy counterattacks. The highest requirement of coordination between tanks and artillery is that artillery provide effective aid, fire at the right time and place, cease firing, and change frequencies promptly, as requested by the tank unit. Tanks must act accurately and rapidly in order to make maximum use of the effectiveness of artillery fire. If that is to be accomplished the tank units ordinarily must carefully discuss with the artillery units the targets, formations, method of attack, and the possible speed of the tanks on the terrain in the battle area, so that the artillery units can have a basis on which to draft firepower plans.

In order to maintain continuous coordination, the artillery commander can travel in the same vehicle with the tank commander and many artillery observation posts can be set up on high points along the route taken by the tanks to ensure prompt communications and movement. Normally, efforts are made to place artillery near the enemy's forward positions in order to limit movement in the process of supporting tanks in combat according to plan. In order to promptly increase the intensity of firepower support for tanks, the artillery units must make maximum use of the capabilities of mortars and the various kinds of accompanying artillery, and do a good job of moving firepower and artillery, especially firepower.

Combat coordination between tanks and the air force. In modern offensive campaigns, coordination between tank troops and the air force is indispensable, especially when tanks are carrying out deep penetration and boomerang missions, when artillery fire support is less effective or impossible. According to the experience of the Soviet Red Army, while on the offensive the air force must set aside 40.5 percent of its forces and flying time to support tanks and infantry. If the tanks are part of mobile campaign groups the ratio is even higher. By means of high mobility, strong firepower, and many modern communications, reconnaissance, reporting, and other facilities, the air force can aid the tanks in many spheres. It can provide the tank troops with photographs of the battle area and the targets the tanks will attack. Those photographs help the tank and armored commanders in the battle areas to have

better understanding of the enemy's defenses, troop concentrations, headquarters, chemical warfare positions, obstacle systems, etc. Therefore, they can assign more accurate missions to the subunits and have more rational methods for coordinating combat among the units. The air force, along with the artillery, can neutralize and knock out the main targets of the enemy troops on the defensive and support the tanks when they are assaulting and developing their attack, first of all by firing on the enemy's forward positions before the tanks and infantry launch their assault. But an even more important mission is for the air force to support the tanks when they are developing their attack deeply into the enemy defenses. Air force firepower not only promptly suppresses or knocks out enemy positions which directly stop our tanks and infantry, such as pockets of resistance, anti-tank concentrations, and artillery and missile positions, but also suppresses or knocks out counterattacking enemy tanks and infantry. Air force firepower is also used to knock out such rear-area enemy targets as airfields, supply depots, and areas in which the enemy have mass-destruction weapons, which threaten our tanks throughout the attack. In order to fulfill those missions, the air force must know the tanks' main direction of attack, the objectives the tanks must take, the immediate missions and the follow-up missions, the areas in which the tank units will develop their attack, and the areas in which the enemy can stop our tanks. The tank units must fully understand the operational capabilities of the air force and its support capabilities and methods with regard to tanks, and the methods the tank troops must use to coordinate with the air force. In coordination it is necessary to determine the signs and signals for recognizing our tanks. It is necessary to maintain constant communications between the tank commander and the air force representative. The best method would be for the person representing the air force commander to accompany the tank commander. When necessary, the air force can set up observation posts beside the tank observation posts in order to promptly cope with contingencies.

Combat coordination between tank troops and anti-aircraft troops. Coordination between tank troops and anti-aircraft troops must receive special attention when tank troops are fighting in daytime, on open terrain, and in weather favorable for enemy air activities. In battles and offensive campaigns carried out by combined combat arms and armed forces branches, the anti-aircraft forces participating in the fighting always make protecting the combat formations of the infantry and tanks their primary mission. The anti-aircraft forces, which include the anti-aircraft units of the tanks, the campaign anti-aircraft units, the anti-aircraft and machinegun forces of the infantry units, and the local anti-aircraft and machinegun forces, must be organized and commanded in combat in close coordination with a unified plan. Anti-aircraft firepower must not only create a net of fire to oppose the enemy's bomber and fighter aircraft but must also pay special attention to the various kinds of helicopters, an effective anti-tank facility that is being used extensively on battlefields in modern war.

The anti-aircraft and machinegun units in the table of organization of the tank troops must, along with the campaign anti-aircraft units, directly support the tank troops, and ensure the tanks' safety from air attacks after they have taken their objectives as well as when they are attacking and developing their attack. When conditions allow, the anti-aircraft units can take up positions

before the battle begins. The organic and reinforced anti-aircraft units can be used by dividing them up to accompany each tank and armored unit, in order to provide direct, prompt support. The anti-aircraft units must have sufficient ammunition reserves to support the tanks from the beginning of the attack to the fulfillment of daytime missions, and avoid the phenomenon of the enemy airforce being able to fire at will into our tank formations because we do not have sufficient ammunition.

Combat coordination between the tank troops and the military engineers. On battlefields in our country the military engineer forces play an extremely important role in ensuring the mobility of tanks and armored vehicles. In some cases they are the decisive factor with regard to the capability to send a large number of tanks and armored vehicles to the battles and offensive campaign to coordinate with the other combat arms. In modern combat, with the coordination of combat arms and armed forces branches on the ground, ensuring the mobility of tanks and armored vehicles is regarded as a foremost mission of the military engineer troops.

The military engineer forces' mission of ensuring the mobility of the tanks and armored vehicles is manifested principally in the following tasks: preparing, repairing, and building roads, preparing river crossing points, opening paths through the enemy's obstacles, and supporting and ensuring the mobility of tanks in the course of the attack. Therefore, it is necessary to, on the basis of the specific situation, divide up the missions, some of which will be undertaken by the strategic military engineers, some by the campaign and tactical military engineers, and some by the organic military engineers of the tank units.

On the basis of the combat decisions of the combined combat arms commander, the tank and military engineer commanders must discuss coordination with regard to ensuring mobility for tanks. The two commanders must jointly reconnoitre the terrain in the campaign or battle assembly area and along the tanks' assault route, in order to determine matters relevant to ensuring mobility, and must discuss methods for ensuring mobility. The most important of those matters is to determine the roads, the lines of adjustment, the points where routes are to be opened through enemy obstacles (if any), the completion times, the requirements regarding technical standards, etc.

On the basis of the enemy's situation, in our combat missions, times, capabilities, and plans we can easily determine what tasks must be completed before the fighting begins, what tasks can be fulfilled when we begin the attack, and what tasks can be prepared in advance only to a certain extent and continued after the attack begins, etc.

Along the roads used by tanks there must be clearly marked signs easily seen by the drivers. Along routes opened through obstacles the signs must be painted white, with the fronts facing in our direction, and at night the signs must be illuminated and camouflaged so that enemy airplanes cannot spot them. In the course of developing the attack within the enemy's defensive positions there must be combat engineer forces with mobile obstacle emplacement units accompanying the combat formations of the tank units to quickly overcome natural obstacles or obstacles placed by the enemy, in order to ensure that the tanks'

rate of advance is not decreased. If the enemy counterattack, the mobile obstacle emplacement units must quickly place obstacles, especially anti-tank mines, to stop the enemy and protect the flanks of our tank formations so that they can continue to attack the designated targets and develop the attack.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ELECTRONIC WARFARE ON HO CHI MINH TRAIL REVIEWED

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[Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Phuong: "Electronic Warfare and Counter-Electronic Warfare on the Truong Son Route"]

[Jan 84 pp 64-70]

[Text] In their war of aggression against our country the U.S. imperialists, because they were able to grasp modern scientific advances, waged "secret electronic warfare" on the Truong Son route in hopes of carrying out their strategic scheme to completely prevent the aid of the our soldiers and people in the north from reaching the south.

In order to defeat that U.S. electronic warfare plot and scheme, our people and troops manifested a spirit of courage, intelligence, and creativity, brought into play the scientific-technical strength of people's war, fought persistently and fiercely, and won a brilliant victory.

This article, based on our research materials and the materials and documents of many U.S. scientific organs and a number of authors who have written about the war on the "trail," reviews the principal schemes of the U.S. electronic warfare and the response of our troops in the Truong Son area.

I. The Appearance of the U.S. "Secret Electronic Warfare"

A principal requirement of the strategic doctrine of the U.S. aggressors in Vietnam was completely stopping the flow of supplies from the north to the resistance war forces in the south, in order to force the revolutionary war of our people in the south into an isolated, surrounded, and tightly controlled situation.

From 1963 to 1966 the U.S. Air Force in fact replaced the Royal Lao Air Force in carrying out that perfidious scheme, but still could cut off the increasingly greater flow of supplies from the soldiers and people of the north, which reached "alarming proportions" as far as the U.S. and their puppets were concerned.

In the summer of 1966 the U.S. government had to hold a meeting to study in depth the effect of the "Rolling Thunder" air force operation.

The meeting was held in Wellesley, Massachusetts under the auspices of the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analysis.

The conference was attended by 47 of the most outstanding scholars in the United States in the field of technology. McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at that time, directly monitored and guided the contents of the study on exploiting technical capabilities relevant to the U.S. military activities in Vietnam.

High-ranking U.S. officials from the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA presented top secret and secret information on the war of aggression in Vietnam to the scientists. After listening to reports and studying new methods, ultimately the conference reached the following conclusions.

-- An expanded bombing campaign absolutely could not "prevent Hanoi from infiltrating people and supplies to the south," at the present rate or at a higher rate.

-- Another solution had to be used: building an "electronic barrier" across the DMZ by the use of newly invented devices.

McNamara was very enthusiastic over that new proposal. He immediately assigned Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, a military engineer specialist, the task of studying the construction of such a barrier. U.S. reporters also quickly bragged about that imposing project in the newspapers, calling it a "Maginot Line of the East," the "McNamara Line," etc.

But within only 6 months after construction began the great weaknesses of such a barrier were clearly revealed: it was fixed and passive, the enemy could easily destroy it and, especially, it tied down a very large force. Maj Gen Max S. Johnson, a planning officer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, evaluated the McNamara barrier project as being impractical. He wrote, "It is necessary to set up a defensive zone along the 17th Parallel, from the sea to the bank of the Mekong River, a distance of about 200 miles. To ensure that the barrier is not penetrated at least 10 to 12 U.S. divisions will be needed, along with a corresponding increase in air support. That is a rear services burden that is difficult to bear. But it would be necessary to extend the defense line even further if the North decided to detour around the two flanks."

Jason's technical specialists actively studied and proposed the use of large numbers of intercepting equipment in order to entirely abandon the deployment of manpower along the line of interception. It was necessary to wage the "electronic warfare" on an "automated battlefield" and attain as actively as possible the strategic objective of completely cutting off the enemy's source of supply.

That was an attractive objective for the U.S. government, which had concentrated great amounts of finance, technical materials, and forces there. In September 1966 the U.S. began to carry out that plan and in December 1967 truly began to wage "electronic warfare" in the Truong Son area.

II. Organizing the McNamara Line, Advancing to the "Electronic Battlefield" and the Igloo White Program

During the last months of 1966 work on the MacNamara line began in the Truong Son area south of the DMZ. It was to cross the Lao-Vietnam border and extend to Schepon and Muong Phin, covering an area about 100 kilometers long and about 30 kilometers wide, to counter the infiltration of troops and cargo trucks. The barrier would consist of barbed wire, with mines sown on the slopes and in the valleys and with South Vietnamese and Lao puppet troops serving as the garrison. The fence was divided into two "anti-infiltration" systems:

-- An anti-troop movement system. To detect troops, "People Sniffers" would be scattered along trails crossing mountains to "catch" the odor of sweat and urine. "Dragons' teeth" mines and "button" mines would be sown to break people's legs.

-- An anti-transportation system. In order to detect movement it was necessary to use M.S.Q. radar to "pick up" the sound of vehicles and people in motion. Aircraft patrolled continually in the skies above, 24 hours a day, to pick up signals and inform fighter-bombers so that they could attack the targets.

Every 2 days aircraft photographed the entire barrier area to detect signs of destruction and infiltration by the enemy.

When it was learned that our troops were still moving safely and that supplies were still reaching the battlefields, the Jason Division recommended the use of "earth churning" chemicals. At the beginning of the Truong Son rainy season in 1966, C-130 aircraft transported tons of dissolving chemicals to spread along the routes passing through the A Sau Valley. Although the land in that area had been made soft and the road used by trucks was a stream of mud which reached half way to the knee, no accurate conclusions could be reached about the benefit of that interdiction method.

The outposts were equipped with Starlight scopes, which magnified starlight to facilitate nighttime surveillance. Aircraft continually dropped Gravel and Sadeyes mine bombs, in numbers amounting to more than 20 million a month, mixed in with Mark 36 Destructor fragmentation mines to stop troop movements. Very powerful Daisey Cutter bombs were dropped to clear large areas of jungle. The U.S. Department of Defense transformed C-130 aircraft into combat aircraft for use over the trails. They were equipped with extremely powerful searchlights and with cannon which fired Cofram shells, lethal over a large area.

The U.S. spent more than 800 million dollars a year to set up that interception network.

It is always true that the superiority of a measure is not measured only by its technological sufficiency and great financial expenditure, but must be verified by actual results.

After the 1968 Tet General Offensive by our soldiers and people in the south, at a conference held in the first part of 1969, the U.S. strategists and scientific circles reached a unanimous conclusion: "The electronic McNamara barrier has in fact been abandoned in the war to interdict the enemy.... It must be replaced immediately with an effective method of achieving the interdiction objective."

The researchers of the "Air Warfare Technical Center" and the "Defense Communications Planning Group," working with the Jason Division, introduced the new "automated battlefield"- "electronic battlefield" concept. The U.S. President, who regarded that as an effective strategy for achieving the strategic objective, immediately directed the Department of Defense to implement it as soon as possible.

The U.S. Department of Defense immediately mobilized the funds and forces of all five armed forces branches, including money, equipment, and organization, urgently began a program to research a model "automated battlefield," and set up three groups which played important roles in that project:

- The first was the Defense Communications Planning Group, which had been formed in 1966.
- The second was the Surveillance Target Acquisition and Night Observation group.
- The third was the Mobile Army Sensor System Test and Review group.

The electronic systems section at Hanscom AFB near Boston used the state-of-the-art technical methods of the space sectors to study the plan to use electronics in the war along the "Trail." More than 100 types of equipment were used and many types of equipment were closely coordinated with one another to form complete systems which served to effectively regulate the activities. The Igloo White program was a large combined program which played a key role in the air war in Laos.

"Igloo" meant the round white lodge built by the Eskimos at the North Pole. What was hidden under that poetic name at times deceived and stimulated the technical "infatuation" of those who guided the scientific electronic equipment which cruelly and coldbloodedly killed people.

The Igloo White center was set up at Nakhon Phanom in Thailand. There was installed at the center a "trail surveillance system" with two gigantic IBM 360-65 computers. Those computers had the mission of analyzing the noises and vibrations in order to distinguish between people and vehicles and accurately determine the time and location of those sounds. The information was then sent to an "intelligence controller" at the center controlling the battlefield in order to give orders for the aircraft to attack. It may be said that all of the annihilating, barbarian, ruthless activities originated there.

So that the Igloo White center could guide all of the air force's operational activities, the U.S. "scientists" "invented" a system of devices to detect

earth vibrations and sounds, which were dropped all over the jungles and along the main routes. They were called "road guards." The most widely used types were:

SPILL HUVV, a sound-sensing device that was dropped by air and planted itself in the ground, to detect motion in the surrounding area.

ACCUHUVV, a parachute-equipped sound-sensing device that was dropped from the air into trees to pick up sounds over a large area and to prevent the enemy from promptly discovering them.

ASID, a seismographic sensing device with a small antenna which looked like a tropical sapling emerging from the earth.

ACCISIT, a device for sensing earth movements and sounds, was similar to ASID but could at the same time transmit signals about both sounds and movements.

In order to transmit real time data from the detection devices to the Igloo White center, there had to be aircraft to relay the transmissions. At first the U.S. used KC-121B aircraft, which were improved four-engined Constellation aircraft. There was later added the one-engined QJ-22B aircraft, which could fly at very high altitudes. Because it was a pilotless aircraft it could fly into areas with heavy anti-aircraft fire and still fulfill its mission. By bringing that type of aircraft into operation, every year the U.S. reduced its need for pilots in activities along the Truong Son route by more than 1,000. Sometime later, the technical specialists invented a system of "automatically activated relay stations," called DART for short. It was placed aboard an aircraft so that it could easily be transported to the area of control. That device was an urgent auxiliary facility for the control center (ISC) which had to be fixed in one place.

The U.S. specialists had to spend more than 1 billion dollars to set up such a relatively complete Igloo White program.

Despite such expenditures and such modern expenditures, the "hard data" sent from the front gave the headquarters organ of that electronic warfare to have a splitting headache. The U.S. specialists also studied a new supplementary activity program called "Commando Bolt."

That new system would collect intelligence information by means of a network of devices in the front and analyze developments in a specific zone. In each such zone a "controlling officer" was responsible for the systems of detection devices, the communications relay aircraft, and the attack aircraft. The officer monitored developments via television. The entire road network in the zone appeared on the screen and the continually operating reconnaissance aircraft in the area reported signals before target appeared, and the sound-sensing devices also reported on the various kinds of sounds. The automatic system responded very quickly and the officer needed only inform the various kinds of aircraft operating nearby to attack the designated targets. In bad weather a computer helped the combat aircraft automatically bomb the designated points.

Thus the Commando Bolt plan increased the air force's capability to attack the Truong Son route under all weather conditions. It called for the use of naval A6 aircraft equipped with radar to detect moving vehicles at night, and similarly equipped army B-57G aircraft, in that interdiction program.

It was essential that there be weapons which "corresponded" to that advanced reconnaissance-command system. The U.S. "scientists" "invented" many types of truly terrible, barbaric weapons to kill people, and very thorough computers for all circumstances. The principal types were the following:

WAAPM, a round bomb with grooves. The bombs were contained in large cannisters. When the bombs were released they automatically turned around so that they could "arm themselves" when they reached the ground, or lay motionless if they landed in trees. Only a slight knock would set them off, which would cause the other bombs scattered around the area to explode. Tens of thousands of small fragments flew in all directions. They were usually dropped into storage depot areas or in areas in which many road repair workers were concentrated.

The M36, a small bomb in cannisters carrying 182 bombs. When the bomb cannister broke apart the bombs exploded one after another. From afar the area in which the bombs were exploding appeared to be streaks of lightning striking the surface of a lake.

The lethal effect of a cannister of bombs was sufficient to kill a platoon of infantry on the move. They were normally used against truck parks and ferry landings.

BLU 31, a mine weighing 705 pounds, buried itself in the ground on impact. When a vehicle passed by the bomb was activated and exploded. That type of bomb was normally used to bomb roads and destroy trucks.

PAVE PATH, a bomb weighing 2,500 pounds, had a parachute attached to its tail. It was full of propane. It was designed to explode four to six meters above the ground and create high pressure. When it exploded it destroyed everything in an area of about 1,000 square meters.

The MK 30 was a bomb of great destructive power. Its fuse would activate when a large object (a truck, tank, artillery piece, or boat) passed by. If the object exerted the predetermined pressure the bomb would explode. That type of bomb was normally dropped on key targets, mountain passes, or supply depots and truck parks.

DRAGON TOOTH bombs. One aircraft dropped about 3,000 of them. They were used principally to prevent troop movements and prevent people from coming to their aid. They were normally dropped along troop movement routes.

GRAVEL bombs played a role similar to that of dragon tooth bombs, but it was shaped like a pouch the size of a hand. It was very difficult for troops on the move to detect it. Anyone who stepped on one would immediately lose a foot.

The CBU-24 bomb was round and larger than a hand grenade. When it exploded it released hundreds of round fragments. Its function was to kill and wound people and to damage vehicles.

The CBU-49 was similar to the CBU-24 but such bombs were fitted with fuses set to go off at different times. An area in which several hundred of them had been dropped by air became a dangerous, life-threatening area. They were usually dropped in areas in which they had just inflicted heavy damage, to hinder relief personnel.

EO (electrical-optical) bombs weighed about 1,000 pounds and had a small TV camera in their nose. When the bomb cleared the aircraft it would fly to its target. It was mainly used to bomb bridges, tunnels, caves, bunkers, etc., in places protected by heavy antiaircraft fire.

Bombs guided by lasers -- "smart" bombs -- could guide themselves to their targets by means of a laser guidance system.

Thus the "electronic battlefield" was no longer limited to attacks in the sphere of an interdiction "corridor" but had expanded its sphere of annihilation to the entire Truong Son area, nearly 1,000 kilometers long and 60 to 70 kilometers wide.

But in 1970 nearly all of the scientists who specialized in creating those murderous programs, and the U.S. Strategists, admitted that "between 1966 and 1969 the Viet Cong received 21,600 tons of weapons and 4,600 tons of rockets."

Professor William Heselstine of Harvard University observed that "the impotence of the automated battlefield became very evident when the communist troops proved capable of launching massive attacks against U.S. troops in Kampuchea and Laos at a time when North Vietnam was experiencing the greatest flood in its history and the Sihanoukville port had been blockaded. Where did the supplies used in those attacks come from, if not brought in via the trail?(1)

In order to overcome those major deficiencies of the Igloo White program the U.S. scientists again plunged into "inventing" weapons to kill people even more cruelly, to be worthy of the "prestige" of U.S. science.

In March 1971 the U.S. Department of Defense studied the operational capabilities of low-speed transport aircraft equipped with powerful weapons to hunt down trucks at night.

The U.S. scientists recommended the use of C130 aircraft equipped with electronic equipment:

- A system for receiving reconnaissance signals from the ground.
- Cathode ray tubes sensitive to the electronic emissions of trucks very far away, so that AC-130 aircraft could be guided to them.
- When he arrived at the target area the pilot directly observed the object by means of television equipment which amplified dim light.

-- A system for guiding target acquisition.

-- 40mm cannon equipped with computers to accurately determine range and control firing at the right time.

The AC-130 aircraft were capable of remaining in the control zone 3 to 4 hours at a time, and of closely controlling an area about 4,000 square kilometers in extent.

In 1971 and 1972 AC-130 aircraft called "Pave Spectre" were most widely used in the Truong Son area. The U.S. then added the "Black Spot" aircraft, which "hunted trucks most effectively." That was in December 1972, which was also the time when the "electronic warfare" of the "most outstanding" U.S. strategists and technical specialists ended.

[Feb 84 pp 57-69]

[Text] III. Our Troops' Retaliation Against the U.S. Electronic Warfare-Automated Battlefield on the Truong Son Route.

From the time they were formed to the time they fulfilled their historic mission the forces of our soldiers and people on the strategic Truong Son transportation route had to fulfill their mission under the pressure of the fierce "interdiction campaign" waged by the modern U.S.-puppet combat arms and armed forces branches, but the principal role was played by the air force, and the epitome of that "interdiction war" was the "electronic war."

Our forces on that strategic transportation route were equipped mainly with ordinary weapons and technical equipment, such as cargo trucks, antiaircraft guns, specialized military engineering vehicles, telephone and wireless communications equipment, hoes, shovels, sharpened bamboo stakes, explosives, etc.

Under the analytical eyes of the bourgeois U.S. scientists, the U.S. had superiority in the comparison of forces regarding the quantity and quality of technical facilities and there could be no other conclusion but that the U.S. would master the Truong Son.

But in actuality our army won a glorious victory, although that victory was not attained easily. It was a victory which exemplified the heroic fighting spirit and limitless sacrifice for the enterprise of liberating the south and defending the north, as well as the ability of people's war to grasp science and technology, and the faultless, resourceful and creative actions of our cadres and men.

In recapitulating the war against the enemy's interdiction of the Truong Son route, we have already presented, profoundly and comprehensively, the experiences and factors. In this part we will essentially discuss the system of working methods of the forces maintaining the roads, who coped effectively with the U.S. electronic warfare.

1. Destroying the system of electronic surveillance devices dropped by the U.S. along the Truong Son route.

Organizing the destruction of the system of reconnaissance devices was essentially the responsibility of the military engineer companies defending the route. Each military engineer company was responsible for ensuring traffic on a segment of the route and had to continually monitor the operations of enemy aircraft. They used observation posts and reconnaissance teams along the route.

From experience the observation posts were able to tell whether an airplane was dropping bombs, or if not what it was dropping, by merely listening to the sound of the aircraft as it passed overhead and dived. The observation post immediately reported to the commander the enemy's activity and the direction in which they were descending.

The commander immediately sent out reconnaissance teams, which brought along equipment to urgently destroy or disarm the bombs; while also immediately reporting back to the commander. When it found a detection device that had been dropped by the enemy the military engineer team immediately destroyed the bomb or mine.

-- The sensing devices were equipped with self-destruction and anti-disarming devices. It was necessary to defuse the device to avoid endangering lives.

-- The parachute-equipped sensing devices were destroyed by firing into them or else they were disarmed.

-- The antenna was cut off the type that buried itself in the ground.

-- It was possible to use satchel charges with specific amounts of explosives to blow up the devices.

-- The destruction methods were widely disseminated, so all units had people who knew how to destroy them.

As a result, more than 80 percent of the reaction devices dropped by the enemy in the jungle areas were eliminated. Along the supply and troop movement routes they were eliminated within a day, or in cases in which some were overlooked, in not more than a week. Therefore, tens of thousands of our vehicles continued to operate without interruption, and hundreds of thousands of our cadres and men reached the battlefields to accept their missions. The U.S. aircraft could not discover them or stop them.

2. Destroying magnetic mines.

The destruction of magnetic mines was carried out as follows:

The reconnaissance teams closely monitored the activities of enemy aircraft in the area for which they were responsible. Experience taught them that if an enemy airplane dived down in daytime and released a bomb form which fins could be seen extending from the tail or, if at night, the bomb landed softly and

there was no explosion, the enemy had dropped magnetic bombs.

The reconnaissance team went to the point where the bomb landed, determined what kind it was, and prepared to destroy it. The only tools it had were a brass shovel, a rope, a lever, and some explosives, so that it could dig around the bomb and blow it up.

When a magnetic bomb landed, ordinarily only part of it was buried in the ground, while the tail, from which fins extended, was still visible on the surface. It was absolutely forbidden to touch the bomb fins. It was possible to place an explosive charge to break off its tail to avoid danger when the bomb was dug up, after which it was rolled down a ravine.

When magnetic bombs landed on soft ground they penetrated deeply. Instead of digging them up, methods to activate the magnetic sensor in the bomb were used. At first the military engineers, relying on electronic reaction principles, applied simple methods of detecting and destroying the bombs, such as pulling steel bars to which a magnet had been attached close to them. If it was pulled at varying speeds, the bomb would explode. After the Ministry's scientific-technical organ guided the production and use of counter-electronic facilities to activate and blow up the bombs, they could blow up a number of them at the same time, including those that had buried themselves into the ground or dropped into rivers.

That method was somewhat complicated. Sometimes the electrical emission was too weak, or too strong, compared to the bomb's sensitivity. In such cases the bomb would not explode. But thanks to the discovery of that characteristic, our technicians "invented" the technical method of "controlling the electromagnetic reaction" of the bombs, to prevent them from exploding when necessary. Many times, after a "magnetic" mine fell into a depot area we used that "controlling" method, so that the ammunition and material facilities could be removed. Only then was the bomb exploded.

1. Destroying trip wire bombs.

First of all, the observation stations had to monitor the activities of enemy aircraft in the areas for which they were responsible. The observation stations informed the road-bound reconnaissance teams of what it observed when the enemy aircraft dived down to drop bombs and the direction in which they were flying.

In addition to the experience they gained in monitoring the ways in which the various kinds of enemy bombs were dropped, the reconnaissance personnel paid special attention to the crashing sound in the treetops and the tearing sound of something crashing to the ground without exploding. The reconnaissance personnel knew that they were "trip wire" bombs. The name "trip wire" bombs was given to them by the military engineers. The shape of the "trip wire" bomb was similar to that of cluster bombs, but on top there were four "eyes" which automatically turned and ejected four light green wires. Those wires twined around anything they touched and held the bomb in place, "waiting" to explode. At that time, any contact which caused a small movement would cause the bomb to explode and also cause other bombs nearby to explode.

After a careful reconnaissance was made the bomb demolition unit was sent, along with its equipment: a "mobile shield" made from half of a 200 liter drum that had been split lengthwise, the outside of which was padded with straw or dried grass, and inside of which there was a wooden bar so that it could easily be carried to a point near the bomb; and a long pole to set off the explosion.

The bomb demolition personnel slowly advanced into the area with trip wire bombs and used the pole to knock lightly against one of the wires. When the bomb exploded the person was crouched behind the shield. When the explosions ended he would go to set off explosions elsewhere.

It was also possible to use satchel charges, in the same way that they are used to blow up fences when enemy outposts are attacked (but with smaller quantities of explosives). They were thrown into areas in which there were bombs. When the satchel charge exploded it cleared out the bombs by causing a chain-action explosion.

If the enemy's routine for dropping bombs in a certain area was known, the bomb demolition teams would cover that segment of the road with tree branches which were tied to long (about 50 to 60 meters) ropes. After the enemy dropped bombs the bomb demolition unit pulled the ropes, setting off all the bombs in the area.

4. Destroying "dragon's teeth" and "pouch" bombs.

On the basis of the discoveries of the observation stations, the military engineer teams searched the area in which the enemy dropped the bombs, gathered them all up, and threw them into deep ravines or in water-filled pits. It was also possible to use trucks with new tires to explode the bombs by running over them, or destroy them by using mallets.

5. Rendering the electro-optical and "smart" bombs ineffective.

The U.S. could not (or could not yet) drop electro-optical bombs at night, which would render their television equipment useless.

In countering that kind of bomb, the key matter was to change the physical appearance of the target it was intended to attack, so that the laser ray could not reach the target.

The military engineers defending bridges and submerged crossings were continually concerned with camouflaging and changing the surroundings to create a new setting which did not match the predetermined sensing system. Many units used smoke to obscure the target.

Another method, which was the most effective, was to deploy very strong antiaircraft firepower to control the enemy.

6. Countering the schemes of the AC-130 aircraft.

The attacks carried out by AC-130 aircraft were the highest synthesis of the

1.3. electronic war along the Truong Son route. The strengths of the AC-130 aircraft were that it was capable of observing clearly at night, attacked with considerable accuracy, and had a speed suitable for the speed of moving vehicles, so it could pursue and accurately attack vehicles in motion and could remain on the scene for a very long time.

In order to counter those facilities and schemes of the enemy, it was first of all necessary to organize long-range warning posts and warning posts along the route, combined with observation posts at high altitudes to give timely alerts by "secret" signals so that the truck units on routes threatened by AC-130 aircraft could promptly seek cover.

Along each segment of the route it was necessary to open up many alternate routes and improve roads so that vehicles could use them to avoid being attacked.

Taking advantage of the weaknesses of the "infrared" equipment and the "cathode ray" transmitters on aircraft, which could not distinguish the source of the "infrared" or cathode rays, the military engineers started up engines in underground bunkers and used oil or firewood to heat oil drums until they were red hot, thus deceiving the AC-130 aircraft into remaining in and attacking such places for a long time.

Another measure was to deploy secret antiaircraft positions, with many layers of firepower, to attack by means of equipment, combined with large-caliber machineguns deployed on mountain tops and starting up engines to deceive the enemy into flying into the area, after which they unexpectedly met with strong firepower and were quickly annihilated.

A very great deficiency of the AC-130 aircraft was that it flew at a slow speed and was a large target. During the daytime it was easily hit by antiaircraft fire. The Truong Son troops cleverly set up many false targets at night on a system of unused roads and organized small truck units which traveled short distances at night. At the same time, they built a network of "hidden roads" for large-scale movement by day, strengthened the antiaircraft network, concentrated on annihilating and warding off daytime reconnaissance aircraft so that they could not discover changes in our operational routine, organized a very strict command network regarding travel on the hidden roads, and had road defense units which continually fulfilled the missions of camouflaging, tracking down commandos, and eliminating the various kinds of "sensors" dropped by the enemy.

With such methods, 1971 and 1972, the period in which the enemy widely used AC-130 aircraft, applied electronic technology at the highest level, and even waged "meteorological warfare," were also a period in which the Truong Son troops transported a tons/kilometer volume 14.5 times greater than in the 1965-1966 period.

BRIEFS

PRIEST FLEES FROM VIETNAM--PANAT NIKHOM, Thailand May 6 (PNA-AFP)--A Catholic priest has fled Vietnam by boat and told of what he called widespread persecution of the clergy by Vietnamese authorities. He mentioned book-burning and the takeover of a convent among other forms of harrassment. The Reverend Nguyen Nuy Tuong, a parish priest from the Southern province of Can Tho, said about half of the 100 priests in his diocese had been placed under house arrest. Similar pressure on priests was apparently being applied throughout Vietnam's estimated 30 dioceses, worst of all in the Central Highlands, he charged. Father Nguyen, 40, said the communist authorities in the Central Highlands--where they were the most "fanatical"--had burned books published by the church. [Text] [Davao City THE MINDANAO MIRROR-BULLETIN in English 7-13 May 84 p 3]

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RESTAURANTS TAXED OUT OF EXISTENCE

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 18 May 84 p 21

[Article by Jose Katigbak]

[Text]

VIETNAM'S 57 million people, already battered by inflation and unemployment, will have to tighten their belts even more because of the drying up of credits from Western countries opposed to Hanoi's Kampuchean policies.

This was the message delivered by Mr Tran Thuong, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a rare news conference in Hanoi recently.

Mr Thuong, a Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy, said almost all available capital was being channelled into major industrial projects and the development of agriculture. The consumer segment of the economy must be held to a minimum.

According to Mr Thuong, service industries such as restaurants are being taxed out of existence to conform with the government's "march towards socialism."

But he said some other small capitalists — those employing fewer than 15 workers — would be allowed to carry on because they played a useful role in the economy.

Foreign residents here said a number of small private restaurants had been forced to close in recent months because of exorbitant tax levies.

Problems

The owner of one restaurant still operating said his monthly taxes amounted to about 70,000 dong (US\$7,000 at the official rate of exchange or US\$440 at the black market rate) and doubted if he could remain in business much longer.

"For a country that is poor, eating too much is not good," Mr Thuong explained.

He said the government discouraged

private restaurants by imposing heavy taxes but promised that when the economy improved they would be permitted to operate normally.

Since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea to overthrow the Peking-backed government there in 1979, sources of credit from the non-communist world have slowed to a trickle.

Diplomats in Hanoi said Vietnam's official foreign reserves were virtually wiped out and the country was almost entirely dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival.

Mr Thuong lashed out at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for denying Vietnam what he said was its right to obtain loans and advised the IMF to think twice if it thought it could pressure Hanoi this way.

In what appeared to be a frank appraisal of the economy, he said there were still many problems to be solved but the situation was certainly better than before.

He admitted poor economic management was partly to blame, adding "We are trying to overcome our mistakes step by step."

Mr Thuong said that since 1981 the Soviet Union's non-refundable aid to Vietnam had dropped to a minimum but long-term credits were continuing.

"It's understandable. They can't give us aid forever," he said.

He said goods in the open market had increased 50 to 60 per cent in price annually over the last few years and official unemployment was more than one million.

Wages

But he added these statistics were misleading because "no one can re-

main idle and survive" and part of people's basic needs were available at government-controlled prices.

Mr Thuong said Vietnam's imports this year, mainly from Soviet-bloc countries, were expected to be about US\$1.4 billion against exports of US\$600 million, much the same as last year.

About 50,000 Vietnamese workers were in the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia but he denied Western allegations that their salaries were being withheld to pay off Vietnam's debts to these countries.

Only 10 per cent of their wages went to the Vietnamese government as taxes, Mr Thuong said, although some sources here said the state share was as high as 60 per cent.

The presence of Vietnam's estimated 180,000 troops in Kampuchea was no real drain on the country's resources because the troops had "a low living standard," he said.

Even if the troops were pulled back pending a settlement of the Kampuchean problem they would still have to be maintained.

He said work was continuing on oil and gas exploration projects and it was his hope that Vietnam would adequately meet its annual energy requirements, estimated at more than three million tonnes of oil by 1990. Diplomats here consider the timetable overly optimistic. — Reuter

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